Shell hardware mixed content handler что это
Перейти к содержимому

Shell hardware mixed content handler что это

  • автор:

Shell hardware mixed content handler что это

Для отключения данного рекламного блока вам необходимо зарегистрироваться или войти с учетной записью социальной сети.

Сообщения: 3
Благодарности: 0

Win7 x86 without SP
Столкнулся с похожей проблемой,
событие DistrubutedDCOM тип: Ошибка Код: 10010
регистрация сервера dcom не прошла за отведенное время ожидания
в реестре находит:

[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\AppID\ @="Profile Notification Host" "DllSurrogate=""

»
Записывается в события во время начала завершения работы.
недавно менял настройки UAC (контроля учетных записей) думаю связано так или иначе, выключил за ненадобностью ибо используется фаервол с хипсом
Можно эту ошибку как то исправить? (попробовать исправить )

Сообщения: 25152
Благодарности: 3798

Конфигурация компьютера
Процессор: Core™2 Quad Q8300 @ 2.50GHz
Материнская плата: MSI G41M-P33 Combo
Память: PQI DDR2 (PC2-6400) 2×2048
HDD: SSD OCZ-AGILITY3 — 120GB
Видеокарта: Gigabyte GeForce GTX660 2048Mb
ОС: Windows 10 Pro x64 (11082)

SerpentMage, учетные записи кроме встроенных администратора и гостя — сколько их у вас? Если несколько, проверьте (по времени создания отчета об ошибке) в каждой ли уч. записи происходит ошибка. Проверьте в безопасном режиме с поддержкой сети, будет ли возникать там.
С отключением UAC это вряд ли связано. Со встроенной уч. записью администратора делали что-то?

Сообщения: 3
Благодарности: 0

По умолчанию все, одна учетная запись с правами админа что создается при установке, Guest, administrator.
Blast

в каждой ли уч. записи происходит ошибка

ну я так понимаю она может происходить только под теми учетками под которыми работает служба которая и вызывает ошибку. По времени четко после события «процесс explorer.exe инициализировал действие выключение питания. от имени юзера %username% Unplanned.»
Еще есть вариант что это как связано с amd catalyst драйверами или вообще amd’ешными дровами, но пока что не знаю как именно

Со встроенной уч. записью администратора делали что-то?

нет, ничего не делал
В безопасном режиме эта же ошибка так же всплывает, наряду с другими похожими, но это я думаю связано именно с безопасным режимом.

Последний раз редактировалось SerpentMage, 10-05-2011 в 11:47 .

Shell hardware mixed content handler что это

This site https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/server-system-variables.html is experiencing technical difficulty. We are aware of the issue and are working as quick as possible to correct the issue.

We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

To speak with an Oracle sales representative: 1.800.ORACLE1.

To contact Oracle Corporate Headquarters from anywhere in the world: 1.650.506.7000.

To get technical support in the United States: 1.800.633.0738.

April2010

April 2010 Board reports (see ReportingSchedule).

THIS REPORT IS CLOSED

These reports were due here by Wednesday, 14 April 2010 so that the Incubator PMC could relay them to the board.

Your project might need to report even if it is not listed below, please check your own reporting schedule or exceptions.

Please remember to include:

  • The «incubating since» info.
  • The project’s top 2 or 3 things to resolve prior to graduation.
  • A short description of what your project’s software does.
  • The Signed off by mentor: is for Mentor(s) to show that the Report has been reviewed.

Apache ACE is a software distribution framework that allows you to centrally manage and distribute software components, configuration data and other artifacts to target systems. ACE started incubation on April 24th 2009.

There are currently no issues requiring board or Incubator PMC attention.

  • Karl Pauls and Marcel Offermans did a tutorial on, amongst other things, ACE at the EclipseCon/OSGi DevCon in March.
  • Marcel Offermans presented ACE at the OSGi UK Users Forum end of January.
  • Completed the migration of both the target and server nodes from Ant to Maven, we now have a fully functional Maven build.
  • Switched to the newly agreed terminology in the user interface (in the code, this still needs to be done).
  • Started a discussion about migrating to a common scheduler API, possibly sharing it with Sling and ServiceMix.
  • Toni Menzel did some work on setting up a CI build on Hudson, setting it up and successfully deploying to a Nexus instance using his own setup, still a work in progress on getting it up and running on Apache infrastructure.
  • Implemented the option to statically or dynamically link bundles to features in the UI.

Licensing and other issues

Things to resolve prior to graduation

  • Make a release.
  • Grow the community some more.

Signed off by mentor: Carsten Ziegeler, bdelacretaz

BeanValidation

Bean Validation will deliver an implementation of the JSR303 Bean Validation 1.0 specification.

There are currently no issues requiring IPMC or Board attention.

Since Bean Validation entered incubation on March 1, 2010, we have accomplished the following:

  1. Initial project resources and accounts created
  2. Initial code contribution under SGA from Agimatec GmbH imported into svn
  3. Source code package names updated from com.agimatec to org.apache.bval
  4. Agimatec copyright moved to NOTICE files and removed from source
  5. Three committers are already active making code updates
  6. Started setup of our Confluence space as our main website
  7. Already have one non-committer using the code and submitting patches

Upcoming major goals:

  1. Finish setup of website
  2. Setup and usage of Nexus
  3. First release of artifacts
  4. Start TCK testing

Top 2 or 3 things to resolve before graduation:

  1. Build community
  2. Create at least one release

Signed off by mentor: Kevan

Bluesky

BlueSky has been incubating since 01-12-2008. It is an e-learning solution designed to help solve the disparity in availability of qualified education between well-developed cities and poorer regions of China.

Recently, we’ve passed RealClass release vote in dev mailing list. Now, we are waiting for Bill to check the completeness of the release candidate. Also we are considering to add more feature in the next version of RealClass. The following will be included in the new features.

  • optimize DTU structure;
  • support IPv6 and satellite;

The coding of IPv6 and satellite module has been finished. But we need some time to test the functionality and robustness of the module. After that we would commit that as new version.

Signed off by mentor:

Chemistry

Apache Chemistry is an effort to provide a Java (and possibly others, like JavaScript) implementation of the upcoming CMIS (Content Management Interoperability Services) specification. Chemistry entered incubation on April 30th, 2009.

A list of the three most important issues to address in the move towards graduation

  1. First formal incubator release. Although this is planned, there are several tasks to complete (e.g. documentation) and a learning curve to climb.

Any issues that the Incubator PMC or ASF Board might wish/need to be aware of

There are currently no issues requiring board or Incubator PMC attention.

How has the community developed since the last report

  1. The OpenCMIS project (originally proposed to the Incubator which also targets a Java implementation of CMIS) has joined Apache Chemistry, with the following new committers — David Ward, Florian Müller, Jens Hübel, Martin Hermes, Paul Goetz and Stephan Klevenz
  2. Jeff Potts has contributed his Python CMIS client library and became a committer.
  3. Nick Burch has joined as a new mentor.
  4. Mailing list traffic has increased 2.5 times since last quarter.

How has the project developed since the last report

  1. Development continues at a steady pace, and Chemistry now targets CMIS 1.0 CD07, the version of the specification submitted to OASIS.
  2. Command-line Shell has been contributed (from Nuxeo).
  3. Hudson builds have been setup and stabilized.
  4. An agreement has been been met on how to merge the Chemistry and OpenCMIS codebases. The merge will take place in a branch, until stabilized (which should take no longer than 2 weeks).
  5. A first formal incubator release of the merged Chemistry/OpenCMIS codebases is planned shortly after the merge is complete.

Signed off by mentor: nick, gianugo

Empire-db

Empire-db is a relational data persistence component that aims to overcome the difficulties, pitfalls and restrictions inherent in traditional Object Relational Management (ORM) approaches. Empire-db is on the Apache Incubator since July 2008.

issues to address in the move towards graduation

Empire-db is mature and seems to be used in many productive environments. The release process has been fully implemented according to Apache conventions. User feedback is positive apart from some complaints about the documentation.

Yet our community is still small and we need to do more advertising in order to attract more users. In order to attract more committers we also need to provide a roadmap that shows were Empire-db will be going in the future and how people can participate.

community development since the last report

During the last three months several new users have had questions or suggestions for improvement. The requests have shown that Empire-db is being used in various different environments (OSGi, Spring) and even together with other programming languages than Java (Scala).

One user donated a new example project that demonstrates the use of Empire-db together with Spring that we will publish with our new release.

project development since the last report

We have just finished working on Release 2.0.6 and are currently seeking approval from the Incubator PMC to publish the release. The release contains various new features, improvements and bugfixes. The most important new feature is a reverse engineering component that generates data model mapping files from existing databases either from command line or by a Maven plugin.

Signed off by mentor:
ThomasFischer, Dashorst

Imperius

Imperius has been incubating since November 2007.

Imperius is a rule-based policy evaluation engine based on the CIM-SPL language from Distributed Management Task Force (dtmf.org).

The voting for the first release of Imperius was passed on Jan 18, 2010. The release was initially made available on April 12, 2010 via the Imperius website and mirrors.

Communication continues to be intermittent. However, the community is discussing the next steps for Imperius. The implementation of the CIM-SPL standard appears fairly complete and so, although the community is currently small, we would like to consider promoting Imperius as a formal Apache project.

A list of the most important issues to address in the move towards graduation

  1. Grow community
  2. Javadoc needs improvement

How has the community developed since the last report?

Still limited, although we have confirmation that we have 3 independent committers.

How has the project developed since the last report?

Limited work other than release preparation. Some additional bugs have been reported. Currently discussing the need for possible additional features.

Signed off by mentor: Craig L Russell

JSPWiki

JSPWiki has been incubating since September 2007.

JSPWiki is a JSP-based wiki program.

Quite a few bugs were fixed in the JSP tier. Slimbox was upgraded, various media formats are now supported so you can view youtube or facebook videos, other wikipages, or even external web-pages. Also support was added for multi-file uploads. We also added an experimental wysiwyg editor based on mootools.

ReferenceManager was rewritten to use JCR UUIDs to keep references between pages.

A couple of bugs were fixed and, and the unit test compliance has climbed from 96.8 to 99.3 %.

Of the 28 items (1 was recently added) on the graduation checklist, 19 are complete, so in that area there has been not much progress, with the exception of fixing junit tests.. All open items are documentation and ASF process and infrastructure related. There still is no 3.0.0-incubating-alpha1 release.

It looks like things have slowed down the last few weeks for an unknown reason.

The developer list currently has 88 members, an increase from 82; and the user list has 193 members, an increase from 191.

Signed off by mentor: Craig L Russell

Lucene Connectors Framework

Description

Lucene Connectors Framework is an incremental crawler framework and set of connectors designed to pull documents from various kinds of repositories into search engine indexes or other targets. The current bevy of connectors includes Documentum (EMC), FileNet (IBM), LiveLink (OpenText), Patriarch (Memex), Meridio (Autonomy), SharePoint (Microsoft), RSS feeds, and web content. Lucene Connectors Framework also provides components for individual document security within a target search engine, so that repository security access conventions can be enforced in the search results.

Lucene Connectors Framework has been in incubation since January, 2010.

A list of the three most important issues to address in the move towards graduation

  1. End-user documentation needs to be converted into a usable form; this is probably the biggest obstacle to developing a broader community at this point
  2. Javadoc and nightly builds need to be set up
  3. The first official release needs to be planned and executed

Any issues that the Incubator PMC (IPMC) or ASF Board wish/need to be aware of?

  1. We’d like to know whether there is any official Apache position on inclusion of NTLM implementations in ASF projects, since we’ve gotten mixed signals on this from other developers. This represents a crucial piece of functionality needed to support LiveLink, Meridio, SharePoint, RSS, and Web connectors properly.

How has the community developed since the last report?

We’ve received several queries and comments from non-Apache developers recently. This is a good sign. There is also a Eurocon conference in Prague which will include LCF, where we will have an opportunity to introduce the project to a broader Lucene community.

How has the project developed since the last report?

The LCF site has been fleshed out, and much more extensive developer documentation has been written and linked into the LCF site. Preparations have also been made to pull appropriate build and execution dependencies in using Ivy or Maven. Javadoc is now available to people willing to build the project themselves. The project remains buildable and usable.

Signed off by mentor: Grant Ingersoll

Olio

Olio has been incubating since September 2008.

Olio is a web 2.0 toolkit to help developers evaluate the suitability, functionality and performance of various web technologies by implementing a reasonably complex application in several different technologies.

We have so far put out two releases successfully. Most users are now using the 0.2 release. Except for one issue with the Java version, this release seems to be stable. Several new developers are actively working on the Java version to improve and expand on it’s functionality and robustness.

Olio seems to be the workload of choice for testing virtual machines. Several researchers as well VMware are using Olio for this purpose.

Graduation From Incubation:

Diversity of committers is the primary issue with the project — although we have users, we haven’t been successful in converting them to committers (yet).

We could use the PMC and Board’s help in spreading the word about Olio to get better traction.

Signed off by mentor: Craig L Russell

OODT

Description

OODT is a grid middleware framework for science data processing, information integration, and retrieval. OODT is used on a number of successful projects at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory/ California Institute of Technology, and many other research institutions and universities.

A list of the three most important issues to address in the move towards graduation

  1. Port OODT code and license headers into ASF license headers
  2. OODT contributions from at least 2 other organizations besides JPL
  3. At least one OODT incubating release, hopefully in the first few months

Any issues that the Incubator PMC (IPMC) or ASF Board wish/need to be aware of?

No, not at this time.

How has the community developed since the last report?

Dave Kale, from Children’s Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA), is the first external to JPL contributor to the project (besides mentors of course). Dave contributed the patch for OODT-8, fixing a minor bug in referencing a jar dependency for Maven. Cameron Goodale, another JPL’er (but not a committer), input OODT-14 for documentation that he is working on. Much of the other activity continues to be from the mentors and committers.

How has the project developed since the last report?

Sean Kelly imported the Python version of the OODT query, profile, product, and webgrid components in OODT-6. Work on the initial import into Apache (OODT-3) is nearing completion. Sean McCleese and Andrew Hart have been leading the way. Committers have begun logging new issues in Jira and using the Apache SVN for their current development efforts (e.g., see the efforts from Brian Foster in OODT-10, OODT-11, OODT-12 and OODT-13). Brian Foster also initiated mailing list discussion regarding OODT-15 which proposes to create one top-level build for the OODT components and a versioning scheme for the software.

Signed off by mentor:

Shiro

Shiro is a powerful and flexible open-source application security framework that cleanly handles authentication, authorization, enterprise session management and cryptography.

Shiro has been incubating since June 2008.

The project is just about ready for its first 1.0 release. Cryptography API and implementation adjustments had to be made prior to the 1.0 release, delaying the ‘code complete’ stage before incubator vote by 2 weeks. That effort is being finished this week.

As soon as this code is complete, and we resolve 4 outstanding Jira bugs, we will go immediately initiate the voting process to clear our first 1.0 release (hopefully next week).

The project team is not considering graduation at this point, but after the first release, the team will decide on a roadmap targeting graduation.

Signed off by mentor: Craig L Russell

Apache SIS is a toolkit that spatial information system builders or users can use to build applications containing location context. This project will look to store reference implementations of spatial algorithms, utilities, services, etc. as well as serve as a sandbox to explore new ideas. Further, the goal is to have Apache SIS grow into a thriving Apache top-level community, where a host of SIS/GIS related software (OGC datastores, REST-ful interfaces, data standards, etc.) can grow from and thrive under the Apache umbrella.

Any issues that the Incubator PMC (IPMC) or ASF Board wish/need to be aware of?

Not at this time

Community progress since the last report

Chris Mattmann was contacted by an ESRI representative inquiring about the direction of the project. This lead will be followed as garnering support from ESRI would be big win for the project and attract a large community.

Project progress since last report

Chris Mattmann has finished importing the LocalLucene code into the SIS codebase (SIS-1) and Patrick O’Leary has compiled around ~50,000 geocoded records for development/testing of SIS spatial functions. Work on creating the SIS incubator website (SIS-2) has begun led by Sean McCleese as well.

Signed off by mentor: Kevan, greddin

Socialsite

SocialSite has been incubating since May 2009.

SocialSite has been stalled for quick a long time, but it appears that there is some new movement at Sun/Oracle. There are some details here: http://rollerweblogger.org/roller/entry/oracles_social_site_promise. If there is no movement by the next report, we should consider mothballing this project.

Three most important issues to address for graduation: 1. Get source code grant from Sun, import to SVN. 1. Migrate codebase: repackage, work out bad deps, etc. 1. Learn Apache way: demonstrate that we have a community

SocialSite is an open source Social Networking Service based on Apache Shindig (incubating). The software is not simply a «canned» Social Network or Facebook-in-a-box type of web application; it’s something different. SocialSite is designed to add social networking features to existing web applications and web sites. SocialSite is made up of two parts: a social data server that supports the OpenSocial APIs and extensions and a set of OpenSocial gadgets that provide a complete user-interface for social networking.

Signed off by mentor: Dave Johnson

Tashi

Tashi has been incubating since September 2008.

The Tashi project aims to build a software infrastructure for cloud computing on massive internet-scale datasets (what we call Big Data). The idea is to build a cluster management system that enables the Big Data that are stored in a cluster/data center to be accessed, shared, manipulated, and computed on by remote users in a convenient, efficient, and safe manner.

Tashi has previously encompassed just the tools to manage virtual machines using Xen and KVM, but is gaining the facility to hand out physical machines as well.

Development activities have included fixes to conform to new python programming standards, and a module for Zoni to assign ports on HP blade server switches.

The project is still working toward building a larger user and development community. Michael Ryan, an active committer on the project, has taken a new job and is unable to actively contribute to the project any longer. Richard Gass, who is running a Tashi production environment, has been added as a committer. Richard introduced the Zoni physical hardware management layer to Tashi earlier.

Items to be resolved before graduation:

  • Prepare and review a release candidate
  • Develop community diversity (currently Intel and CMU committers)

Signed off by mentor: Craig L Russell

Traffic Server

Traffic Server is an HTTP proxy server and cache, similar to Squid and Varnish (but better). Traffic Server has been incubated since July 2009.

  • 2010-03-30 The PPMC has begun the graduation process.
  • 2010-03-29 The new home page is launched.
  • 2010-03-17 Diane Smith joins the Traffic Server PPMC.
  • 2010-03-13 Apache Traffic Server v2.0.0-alpha is released.
  • 2010-03-04 The community votes for CTR for trunk, RTC for release branches.
  • 2010-03-02 Manjesh Nilange joins the Traffic Server PPMC.
  • 2010-02-26 Manjesh Nilange joins the project as a new committer.
  • 2010-02-23 2.0.x release branch created, and CI environment setup.
  • 2010-02-09 The last RAT issues are resolved, we’re clean.
  • 2010-02-02 KEYS file added to dist area.
  • 2010-02-02 Automatic sync from SVN dist repo to dist servers setup.
  • 2010-01-18 George Paul joins the Traffic Server PPMC.

The graduation process is completed, and we’ve passed the votes in both the PPMC and the IPMC. A resolution proposal has been submitted to the board for the next board meeting.

Signed off by mentor: Jean-Frederic Clere

Thrift

(project add text here)

Signed off by mentor:

VXQuery

The VXQuery Project implements a standard compliant XML Query processor. It has been in incubation since 2009-07-06.

  • more progress towards running the complete XQTS (XQuery Test Suite)
  • first signs of community interest

Top issues before graduation:

  • Build community
  • Create a release

Signed off by mentor:

  • Нет меток

Shell hardware mixed content handler что это

systemd.exec — Execution environment configuration

Synopsis

service .service , socket .socket , mount .mount , swap .swap

Description¶

Unit configuration files for services, sockets, mount points, and swap devices share a subset of configuration options which define the execution environment of spawned processes.

This man page lists the configuration options shared by these four unit types. See systemd.unit (5) for the common options of all unit configuration files, and systemd.service (5) , systemd.socket (5) , systemd.swap (5) , and systemd.mount (5) for more information on the specific unit configuration files. The execution specific configuration options are configured in the [Service], [Socket], [Mount], or [Swap] sections, depending on the unit type.

In addition, options which control resources through Linux Control Groups (cgroups) are listed in systemd.resource-control (5) . Those options complement options listed here.

Implicit Dependencies¶

A few execution parameters result in additional, automatic dependencies to be added:

  • Units with WorkingDirectory= , RootDirectory= , RootImage= , RuntimeDirectory= , StateDirectory= , CacheDirectory= , LogsDirectory= or ConfigurationDirectory= set automatically gain dependencies of type Requires= and After= on all mount units required to access the specified paths. This is equivalent to having them listed explicitly in RequiresMountsFor= .
  • Similarly, units with PrivateTmp= enabled automatically get mount unit dependencies for all mounts required to access /tmp/ and /var/tmp/ . They will also gain an automatic After= dependency on systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service (8) .
  • Units whose standard output or error output is connected to journal or kmsg (or their combinations with console output, see below) automatically acquire dependencies of type After= on systemd-journald.socket .
  • Units using LogNamespace= will automatically gain ordering and requirement dependencies on the two socket units associated with systemd-journald@.service instances.

Paths¶

The following settings may be used to change a service’s view of the filesystem. Please note that the paths must be absolute and must not contain a » .. » path component.

RootDirectory= chroot (2) system call. If this is used, it must be ensured that the process binary and all its auxiliary files are available in the chroot() jail. Note that setting this parameter might result in additional dependencies to be added to the unit (see above).

The MountAPIVFS= and PrivateUsers= settings are particularly useful in conjunction with RootDirectory= . For details, see below.

If RootDirectory= / RootImage= are used together with NotifyAccess= the notification socket is automatically mounted from the host into the root environment, to ensure the notification interface can work correctly.

Note that services using RootDirectory= / RootImage= will not be able to log via the syslog or journal protocols to the host logging infrastructure, unless the relevant sockets are mounted from the host, specifically:

The host’s os-release (5) file will be made available for the service (read-only) as /run/host/os-release . It will be updated automatically on soft reboot (see: systemd-soft-reboot.service (8) ), in case the service is configured to survive it.

Example 1. Mounting logging sockets into root environment

BindReadOnlyPaths=/dev/log /run/systemd/journal/socket /run/systemd/journal/stdout

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

When DevicePolicy= is set to » closed » or » strict «, or set to » auto » and DeviceAllow= is set, then this setting adds /dev/loop-control with rw mode, » block-loop » and » block-blkext » with rwm mode to DeviceAllow= . See systemd.resource-control (5) for the details about DevicePolicy= or DeviceAllow= . Also, see PrivateDevices= below, as it may change the setting of DevicePolicy= .

Units making use of RootImage= automatically gain an After= dependency on systemd-udevd.service .

The host’s os-release (5) file will be made available for the service (read-only) as /run/host/os-release . It will be updated automatically on soft reboot (see: systemd-soft-reboot.service (8) ), in case the service is configured to survive it.

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

Valid partition names follow the Discoverable Partitions Specification: root , usr , home , srv , esp , xbootldr , tmp , var .

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

To make sure making ephemeral copies can be made efficiently, the root directory or root image should be located on the same filesystem as /var/lib/systemd/ephemeral-trees/ . When using RootEphemeral= with root directories, btrfs should be used as the filesystem and the root directory should ideally be a subvolume which systemd can snapshot to make the ephemeral copy. For root images, a filesystem with support for reflinks should be used to ensure an efficient ephemeral copy.

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

RootHash= RootVerity= is used. The specified hash must match the root hash of integrity data, and is usually at least 256 bits (and hence 64 formatted hexadecimal characters) long (in case of SHA256 for example). If this option is not specified, but the image file carries the » user.verity.roothash » extended file attribute (see xattr (7) ), then the root hash is read from it, also as formatted hexadecimal characters. If the extended file attribute is not found (or is not supported by the underlying file system), but a file with the .roothash suffix is found next to the image file, bearing otherwise the same name (except if the image has the .raw suffix, in which case the root hash file must not have it in its name), the root hash is read from it and automatically used, also as formatted hexadecimal characters.

If the disk image contains a separate /usr/ partition it may also be Verity protected, in which case the root hash may configured via an extended attribute » user.verity.usrhash » or a .usrhash file adjacent to the disk image. There’s currently no option to configure the root hash for the /usr/ file system via the unit file directly.

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

If the disk image contains a separate /usr/ partition it may also be Verity protected, in which case the signature for the root hash may configured via a .usrhash.p7s file adjacent to the disk image. There’s currently no option to configure the root hash signature for the /usr/ via the unit file directly.

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

This option is supported only for disk images that contain a single file system, without an enveloping partition table. Images that contain a GPT partition table should instead include both root file system and matching Verity data in the same image, implementing the Discoverable Partitions Specification.

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

RootImagePolicy= , MountImagePolicy= , ExtensionImagePolicy= systemd.image-policy (7) to use when mounting the disk images (DDI) specified in RootImage= , MountImage= , ExtensionImage= , respectively. If not specified the following policy string is the default for RootImagePolicy= and MountImagePolicy :

root=verity+signed+encrypted+unprotected+absent: \ usr=verity+signed+encrypted+unprotected+absent: \ home=encrypted+unprotected+absent: \ srv=encrypted+unprotected+absent: \ tmp=encrypted+unprotected+absent: \ var=encrypted+unprotected+absent

The default policy for ExtensionImagePolicy= is:

root=verity+signed+encrypted+unprotected+absent: \ usr=verity+signed+encrypted+unprotected+absent

In order to allow propagating mounts at runtime in a safe manner, /run/systemd/propagate on the host will be used to set up new mounts, and /run/host/incoming/ in the private namespace will be used as an intermediate step to store them before being moved to the final mount point.

ProtectProc= noaccess «, » invisible «, » ptraceable » or » default » (which it defaults to). When set, this controls the » hidepid= » mount option of the » procfs » instance for the unit that controls which directories with process metainformation ( /proc/ PID ) are visible and accessible: when set to » noaccess » the ability to access most of other users’ process metadata in /proc/ is taken away for processes of the service. When set to » invisible » processes owned by other users are hidden from /proc/ . If » ptraceable » all processes that cannot be ptrace() ‘ed by a process are hidden to it. If » default » no restrictions on /proc/ access or visibility are made. For further details see The /proc Filesystem. It is generally recommended to run most system services with this option set to » invisible «. This option is implemented via file system namespacing, and thus cannot be used with services that shall be able to install mount points in the host file system hierarchy. Note that the root user is unaffected by this option, so to be effective it has to be used together with User= or DynamicUser=yes , and also without the » CAP_SYS_PTRACE » capability, which also allows a process to bypass this feature. It cannot be used for services that need to access metainformation about other users’ processes. This option implies MountAPIVFS= .

If the kernel doesn’t support per-mount point hidepid= mount options this setting remains without effect, and the unit’s processes will be able to access and see other process as if the option was not used.

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

Much like ProtectProc= above, this is implemented via file system mount namespacing, and hence the same restrictions apply: it is only available to system services, it disables mount propagation to the host mount table, and it implies MountAPIVFS= . Also, like ProtectProc= this setting is gracefully disabled if the used kernel does not support the » subset= » mount option of » procfs «.

BindPaths= creates regular writable bind mounts (unless the source file system mount is already marked read-only), while BindReadOnlyPaths= creates read-only bind mounts. These settings may be used more than once, each usage appends to the unit’s list of bind mounts. If the empty string is assigned to either of these two options the entire list of bind mounts defined prior to this is reset. Note that in this case both read-only and regular bind mounts are reset, regardless which of the two settings is used.

This option is particularly useful when RootDirectory= / RootImage= is used. In this case the source path refers to a path on the host file system, while the destination path refers to a path below the root directory of the unit.

Note that the destination directory must exist or systemd must be able to create it. Thus, it is not possible to use those options for mount points nested underneath paths specified in InaccessiblePaths= , or under /home/ and other protected directories if ProtectHome=yes is specified. TemporaryFileSystem= with » :ro » or ProtectHome=tmpfs should be used instead.

Mount options may be defined as a single comma-separated list of options, in which case they will be implicitly applied to the root partition on the image, or a series of colon-separated tuples of partition name and mount options. Valid partition names and mount options are the same as for RootImageOptions= setting described above.

Each mount definition may be prefixed with » — «, in which case it will be ignored when its source path does not exist. The source argument is a path to a block device node or regular file. If source or destination contain a » : «, it needs to be escaped as » \: «. The device node or file system image file needs to follow the same rules as specified for RootImage= . Any mounts created with this option are specific to the unit, and are not visible in the host’s mount table.

These settings may be used more than once, each usage appends to the unit’s list of mount paths. If the empty string is assigned, the entire list of mount paths defined prior to this is reset.

Note that the destination directory must exist or systemd must be able to create it. Thus, it is not possible to use those options for mount points nested underneath paths specified in InaccessiblePaths= , or under /home/ and other protected directories if ProtectHome=yes is specified.

When DevicePolicy= is set to » closed » or » strict «, or set to » auto » and DeviceAllow= is set, then this setting adds /dev/loop-control with rw mode, » block-loop » and » block-blkext » with rwm mode to DeviceAllow= . See systemd.resource-control (5) for the details about DevicePolicy= or DeviceAllow= . Also, see PrivateDevices= below, as it may change the setting of DevicePolicy= .

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

A read-only OverlayFS will be set up on top of /usr/ and /opt/ hierarchies. The order in which the images are listed will determine the order in which the overlay is laid down: images specified first to last will result in overlayfs layers bottom to top.

Mount options may be defined as a single comma-separated list of options, in which case they will be implicitly applied to the root partition on the image, or a series of colon-separated tuples of partition name and mount options. Valid partition names and mount options are the same as for RootImageOptions= setting described above.

Each mount definition may be prefixed with » — «, in which case it will be ignored when its source path does not exist. The source argument is a path to a block device node or regular file. If the source path contains a » : «, it needs to be escaped as » \: «. The device node or file system image file needs to follow the same rules as specified for RootImage= . Any mounts created with this option are specific to the unit, and are not visible in the host’s mount table.

These settings may be used more than once, each usage appends to the unit’s list of image paths. If the empty string is assigned, the entire list of mount paths defined prior to this is reset.

Each image must carry a /usr/lib/extension-release.d/extension-release.IMAGE file, with the appropriate metadata which matches RootImage= / RootDirectory= or the host. See: os-release (5) . To disable the safety check that the extension-release file name matches the image file name, the x-systemd.relax-extension-release-check mount option may be appended.

When DevicePolicy= is set to » closed » or » strict «, or set to » auto » and DeviceAllow= is set, then this setting adds /dev/loop-control with rw mode, » block-loop » and » block-blkext » with rwm mode to DeviceAllow= . See systemd.resource-control (5) for the details about DevicePolicy= or DeviceAllow= . Also, see PrivateDevices= below, as it may change the setting of DevicePolicy= .

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

A read-only OverlayFS will be set up on top of /usr/ and /opt/ hierarchies. The order in which the directories are listed will determine the order in which the overlay is laid down: directories specified first to last will result in overlayfs layers bottom to top.

Each directory listed in ExtensionDirectories= may be prefixed with » — «, in which case it will be ignored when its source path does not exist. Any mounts created with this option are specific to the unit, and are not visible in the host’s mount table.

These settings may be used more than once, each usage appends to the unit’s list of directories paths. If the empty string is assigned, the entire list of mount paths defined prior to this is reset.

Each directory must contain a /usr/lib/extension-release.d/extension-release.IMAGE file, with the appropriate metadata which matches RootImage= / RootDirectory= or the host. See: os-release (5) .

Note that usage from user units requires overlayfs support in unprivileged user namespaces, which was first introduced in kernel v5.11.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

User/Group Identity¶

These options are only available for system services and are not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

Note that this enforces only weak restrictions on the user/group name syntax, but will generate warnings in many cases where user/group names do not adhere to the following rules: the specified name should consist only of the characters a-z, A-Z, 0-9, » _ » and » — «, except for the first character which must be one of a-z, A-Z and » _ » (i.e. digits and » — » are not permitted as first character). The user/group name must have at least one character, and at most 31. These restrictions are made in order to avoid ambiguities and to ensure user/group names and unit files remain portable among Linux systems. For further details on the names accepted and the names warned about see User/Group Name Syntax.

When used in conjunction with DynamicUser= the user/group name specified is dynamically allocated at the time the service is started, and released at the time the service is stopped — unless it is already allocated statically (see below). If DynamicUser= is not used the specified user and group must have been created statically in the user database no later than the moment the service is started, for example using the sysusers.d (5) facility, which is applied at boot or package install time. If the user does not exist by then program invocation will fail.

If the User= setting is used the supplementary group list is initialized from the specified user’s default group list, as defined in the system’s user and group database. Additional groups may be configured through the SupplementaryGroups= setting (see below).

DynamicUser= /etc/passwd or /etc/group , but are managed transiently during runtime. The nss-systemd (8) glibc NSS module provides integration of these dynamic users/groups into the system’s user and group databases. The user and group name to use may be configured via User= and Group= (see above). If these options are not used and dynamic user/group allocation is enabled for a unit, the name of the dynamic user/group is implicitly derived from the unit name. If the unit name without the type suffix qualifies as valid user name it is used directly, otherwise a name incorporating a hash of it is used. If a statically allocated user or group of the configured name already exists, it is used and no dynamic user/group is allocated. Note that if User= is specified and the static group with the name exists, then it is required that the static user with the name already exists. Similarly, if Group= is specified and the static user with the name exists, then it is required that the static group with the name already exists. Dynamic users/groups are allocated from the UID/GID range 61184…65519. It is recommended to avoid this range for regular system or login users. At any point in time each UID/GID from this range is only assigned to zero or one dynamically allocated users/groups in use. However, UID/GIDs are recycled after a unit is terminated. Care should be taken that any processes running as part of a unit for which dynamic users/groups are enabled do not leave files or directories owned by these users/groups around, as a different unit might get the same UID/GID assigned later on, and thus gain access to these files or directories. If DynamicUser= is enabled, RemoveIPC= and PrivateTmp= are implied (and cannot be turned off). This ensures that the lifetime of IPC objects and temporary files created by the executed processes is bound to the runtime of the service, and hence the lifetime of the dynamic user/group. Since /tmp/ and /var/tmp/ are usually the only world-writable directories on a system this ensures that a unit making use of dynamic user/group allocation cannot leave files around after unit termination. Furthermore NoNewPrivileges= and RestrictSUIDSGID= are implicitly enabled (and cannot be disabled), to ensure that processes invoked cannot take benefit or create SUID/SGID files or directories. Moreover ProtectSystem=strict and ProtectHome=read-only are implied, thus prohibiting the service to write to arbitrary file system locations. In order to allow the service to write to certain directories, they have to be allow-listed using ReadWritePaths= , but care must be taken so that UID/GID recycling doesn’t create security issues involving files created by the service. Use RuntimeDirectory= (see below) in order to assign a writable runtime directory to a service, owned by the dynamic user/group and removed automatically when the unit is terminated. Use StateDirectory= , CacheDirectory= and LogsDirectory= in order to assign a set of writable directories for specific purposes to the service in a way that they are protected from vulnerabilities due to UID reuse (see below). If this option is enabled, care should be taken that the unit’s processes do not get access to directories outside of these explicitly configured and managed ones. Specifically, do not use BindPaths= and be careful with AF_UNIX file descriptor passing for directory file descriptors, as this would permit processes to create files or directories owned by the dynamic user/group that are not subject to the lifecycle and access guarantees of the service. Note that this option is currently incompatible with D-Bus policies, thus a service using this option may currently not allocate a D-Bus service name (note that this does not affect calling into other D-Bus services). Defaults to off.

Note that for each unit making use of this option a PAM session handler process will be maintained as part of the unit and stays around as long as the unit is active, to ensure that appropriate actions can be taken when the unit and hence the PAM session terminates. This process is named » (sd-pam) » and is an immediate child process of the unit’s main process.

Note that when this option is used for a unit it is very likely (depending on PAM configuration) that the main unit process will be migrated to its own session scope unit when it is activated. This process will hence be associated with two units: the unit it was originally started from (and for which PAMName= was configured), and the session scope unit. Any child processes of that process will however be associated with the session scope unit only. This has implications when used in combination with NotifyAccess= all , as these child processes will not be able to affect changes in the original unit through notification messages. These messages will be considered belonging to the session scope unit and not the original unit. It is hence not recommended to use PAMName= in combination with NotifyAccess= all .

Capabilities¶

These options are only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

CapabilityBoundingSet= capabilities (7) for details. Takes a whitespace-separated list of capability names, e.g. CAP_SYS_ADMIN , CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE , CAP_SYS_PTRACE . Capabilities listed will be included in the bounding set, all others are removed. If the list of capabilities is prefixed with » ~ «, all but the listed capabilities will be included, the effect of the assignment inverted. Note that this option also affects the respective capabilities in the effective, permitted and inheritable capability sets. If this option is not used, the capability bounding set is not modified on process execution, hence no limits on the capabilities of the process are enforced. This option may appear more than once, in which case the bounding sets are merged by OR , or by AND if the lines are prefixed with » ~ » (see below). If the empty string is assigned to this option, the bounding set is reset to the empty capability set, and all prior settings have no effect. If set to » ~ » (without any further argument), the bounding set is reset to the full set of available capabilities, also undoing any previous settings. This does not affect commands prefixed with » + «.

Use systemd-analyze (1) ‘s capability command to retrieve a list of capabilities defined on the local system.

Example: if a unit has the following,

CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_A CAP_B CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_B CAP_C

then CAP_A , CAP_B , and CAP_C are set. If the second line is prefixed with » ~ «, e.g.,

CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_A CAP_B CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_B CAP_C

then, only CAP_A is set.

Ambient capability sets are useful if you want to execute a process as a non-privileged user but still want to give it some capabilities. Note that in this case option keep-caps is automatically added to SecureBits= to retain the capabilities over the user change. AmbientCapabilities= does not affect commands prefixed with » + «.

Security¶

Note that this setting only has an effect on the unit’s processes themselves (or any processes directly or indirectly forked off them). It has no effect on processes potentially invoked on request of them through tools such as at (1) , crontab (1) , systemd-run (1) , or arbitrary IPC services.

Mandatory Access Control¶

These options are only available for system services and are not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

The value may be prefixed by » — «, in which case all errors will be ignored. An empty value may be specified to unset previous assignments. This does not affect commands prefixed with » + «.

Process Properties¶

LimitCPU= , LimitFSIZE= , LimitDATA= , LimitSTACK= , LimitCORE= , LimitRSS= , LimitNOFILE= , LimitAS= , LimitNPROC= , LimitMEMLOCK= , LimitLOCKS= , LimitSIGPENDING= , LimitMSGQUEUE= , LimitNICE= , LimitRTPRIO= , LimitRTTIME= setrlimit (2) for details on the process resource limit concept. Process resource limits may be specified in two formats: either as single value to set a specific soft and hard limit to the same value, or as colon-separated pair soft:hard to set both limits individually (e.g. » LimitAS=4G:16G «). Use the string infinity to configure no limit on a specific resource. The multiplicative suffixes K, M, G, T, P and E (to the base 1024) may be used for resource limits measured in bytes (e.g. » LimitAS=16G «). For the limits referring to time values, the usual time units ms, s, min, h and so on may be used (see systemd.time (7) for details). Note that if no time unit is specified for LimitCPU= the default unit of seconds is implied, while for LimitRTTIME= the default unit of microseconds is implied. Also, note that the effective granularity of the limits might influence their enforcement. For example, time limits specified for LimitCPU= will be rounded up implicitly to multiples of 1s. For LimitNICE= the value may be specified in two syntaxes: if prefixed with » + » or » — «, the value is understood as regular Linux nice value in the range -20…19. If not prefixed like this the value is understood as raw resource limit parameter in the range 0…40 (with 0 being equivalent to 1).

Note that most process resource limits configured with these options are per-process, and processes may fork in order to acquire a new set of resources that are accounted independently of the original process, and may thus escape limits set. Also note that LimitRSS= is not implemented on Linux, and setting it has no effect. Often it is advisable to prefer the resource controls listed in systemd.resource-control (5) over these per-process limits, as they apply to services as a whole, may be altered dynamically at runtime, and are generally more expressive. For example, MemoryMax= is a more powerful (and working) replacement for LimitRSS= .

Note that LimitNPROC= will limit the number of processes from one (real) UID and not the number of processes started (forked) by the service. Therefore the limit is cumulative for all processes running under the same UID. Please also note that the LimitNPROC= will not be enforced if the service is running as root (and not dropping privileges). Due to these limitations, TasksMax= (see systemd.resource-control (5) ) is typically a better choice than LimitNPROC= .

Resource limits not configured explicitly for a unit default to the value configured in the various DefaultLimitCPU= , DefaultLimitFSIZE= , … options available in systemd-system.conf (5) , and – if not configured there – the kernel or per-user defaults, as defined by the OS (the latter only for user services, see below).

For system units these resource limits may be chosen freely. When these settings are configured in a user service (i.e. a service run by the per-user instance of the service manager) they cannot be used to raise the limits above those set for the user manager itself when it was first invoked, as the user’s service manager generally lacks the privileges to do so. In user context these configuration options are hence only useful to lower the limits passed in or to raise the soft limit to the maximum of the hard limit as configured for the user. To raise the user’s limits further, the available configuration mechanisms differ between operating systems, but typically require privileges. In most cases it is possible to configure higher per-user resource limits via PAM or by setting limits on the system service encapsulating the user’s service manager, i.e. the user’s instance of user@.service . After making such changes, make sure to restart the user’s service manager.

Table 1. Resource limit directives, their equivalent ulimit shell commands and the unit used

Directive ulimit equivalent Unit Notes
LimitCPU= ulimit -t Seconds
LimitFSIZE= ulimit -f Bytes
LimitDATA= ulimit -d Bytes Don’t use. This limits the allowed address range, not memory use! Defaults to unlimited and should not be lowered. To limit memory use, see MemoryMax= in systemd.resource-control (5) .
LimitSTACK= ulimit -s Bytes
LimitCORE= ulimit -c Bytes
LimitRSS= ulimit -m Bytes Don’t use. No effect on Linux.
LimitNOFILE= ulimit -n Number of File Descriptors Don’t use. Be careful when raising the soft limit above 1024, since select (2) cannot function with file descriptors above 1023 on Linux. Nowadays, the hard limit defaults to 524288, a very high value compared to historical defaults. Typically applications should increase their soft limit to the hard limit on their own, if they are OK with working with file descriptors above 1023, i.e. do not use select (2) . Note that file descriptors are nowadays accounted like any other form of memory, thus there should not be any need to lower the hard limit. Use MemoryMax= to control overall service memory use, including file descriptor memory.
LimitAS= ulimit -v Bytes Don’t use. This limits the allowed address range, not memory use! Defaults to unlimited and should not be lowered. To limit memory use, see MemoryMax= in systemd.resource-control (5) .
LimitNPROC= ulimit -u Number of Processes This limit is enforced based on the number of processes belonging to the user. Typically it’s better to track processes per service, i.e. use TasksMax= , see systemd.resource-control (5) .
LimitMEMLOCK= ulimit -l Bytes
LimitLOCKS= ulimit -x Number of Locks
LimitSIGPENDING= ulimit -i Number of Queued Signals
LimitMSGQUEUE= ulimit -q Bytes
LimitNICE= ulimit -e Nice Level
LimitRTPRIO= ulimit -r Realtime Priority
LimitRTTIME= ulimit -R Microseconds

UMask= umask (2) for details. Defaults to 0022 for system units. For user units the default value is inherited from the per-user service manager (whose default is in turn inherited from the system service manager, and thus typically also is 0022 — unless overridden by a PAM module). In order to change the per-user mask for all user services, consider setting the UMask= setting of the user’s user@.service system service instance. The per-user umask may also be set via the umask field of a user’s JSON User Record (for users managed by systemd-homed.service (8) this field may be controlled via homectl —umask= ). It may also be set via a PAM module, such as pam_umask (8) .

Example 2. Add DAX pages to the dump filter

CoredumpFilter=default private-dax shared-dax

KeyringMode= session-keyring (7) for details on the session keyring). Takes one of inherit , private , shared . If set to inherit no special keyring setup is done, and the kernel’s default behaviour is applied. If private is used a new session keyring is allocated when a service process is invoked, and it is not linked up with any user keyring. This is the recommended setting for system services, as this ensures that multiple services running under the same system user ID (in particular the root user) do not share their key material among each other. If shared is used a new session keyring is allocated as for private , but the user keyring of the user configured with User= is linked into it, so that keys assigned to the user may be requested by the unit’s processes. In this mode multiple units running processes under the same user ID may share key material. Unless inherit is selected the unique invocation ID for the unit (see below) is added as a protected key by the name » invocation_id » to the newly created session keyring. Defaults to private for services of the system service manager and to inherit for non-service units and for services of the user service manager.

OOMScoreAdjust= The /proc Filesystem for details. If not specified defaults to the OOM score adjustment level of the service manager itself, which is normally at 0.

Use the OOMPolicy= setting of service units to configure how the service manager shall react to the kernel OOM killer or systemd-oomd terminating a process of the service. See systemd.service (5) for details.

TimerSlackNSec= prctl (2) for more information. Note that in contrast to most other time span definitions this parameter takes an integer value in nano-seconds if no unit is specified. The usual time units are understood too.

Personality= uname (2) shall report, when invoked by unit processes. Takes one of the architecture identifiers arm64 , arm64-be , arm , arm-be , x86 , x86-64 , ppc , ppc-le , ppc64 , ppc64-le , s390 or s390x . Which personality architectures are supported depends on the kernel’s native architecture. Usually the 64-bit versions of the various system architectures support their immediate 32-bit personality architecture counterpart, but no others. For example, x86-64 systems support the x86-64 and x86 personalities but no others. The personality feature is useful when running 32-bit services on a 64-bit host system. If not specified, the personality is left unmodified and thus reflects the personality of the host system’s kernel. This option is not useful on architectures for which only one native word width was ever available, such as m68k (32-bit only) or alpha (64-bit only).

Scheduling¶

Nice= setpriority (2) for details.

CPUSchedulingPriority= sched_setscheduler (2) for details.

CPUSchedulingResetOnFork= fork (2) , and can hence not leak into child processes. See sched_setscheduler (2) for details. Defaults to false.

Sandboxing¶

The following sandboxing options are an effective way to limit the exposure of the system towards the unit’s processes. It is recommended to turn on as many of these options for each unit as is possible without negatively affecting the process’ ability to operate. Note that many of these sandboxing features are gracefully turned off on systems where the underlying security mechanism is not available. For example, ProtectSystem= has no effect if the kernel is built without file system namespacing or if the service manager runs in a container manager that makes file system namespacing unavailable to its payload. Similarly, RestrictRealtime= has no effect on systems that lack support for SECCOMP system call filtering, or in containers where support for this is turned off.

Also note that some sandboxing functionality is generally not available in user services (i.e. services run by the per-user service manager). Specifically, the various settings requiring file system namespacing support (such as ProtectSystem= ) are not available, as the underlying kernel functionality is only accessible to privileged processes. However, most namespacing settings, that will not work on their own in user services, will work when used in conjunction with PrivateUsers= true .

Setting this to » yes » is mostly equivalent to setting the three directories in InaccessiblePaths= . Similarly, » read-only » is mostly equivalent to ReadOnlyPaths= , and » tmpfs » is mostly equivalent to TemporaryFileSystem= with » :ro «.

It is recommended to enable this setting for all long-running services (in particular network-facing ones), to ensure they cannot get access to private user data, unless the services actually require access to the user’s private data. This setting is implied if DynamicUser= is set. This setting cannot ensure protection in all cases. In general it has the same limitations as ReadOnlyPaths= , see below.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

Table 2. Automatic directory creation and environment variables

Directory Below path for system units Below path for user units Environment variable set
RuntimeDirectory= /run/ $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR $RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
StateDirectory= /var/lib/ $XDG_STATE_HOME $STATE_DIRECTORY
CacheDirectory= /var/cache/ $XDG_CACHE_HOME $CACHE_DIRECTORY
LogsDirectory= /var/log/ $XDG_STATE_HOME /log/ $LOGS_DIRECTORY
ConfigurationDirectory= /etc/ $XDG_CONFIG_HOME $CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY

In case of RuntimeDirectory= the innermost subdirectories are removed when the unit is stopped. It is possible to preserve the specified directories in this case if RuntimeDirectoryPreserve= is configured to restart or yes (see below). The directories specified with StateDirectory= , CacheDirectory= , LogsDirectory= , ConfigurationDirectory= are not removed when the unit is stopped.

Except in case of ConfigurationDirectory= , the innermost specified directories will be owned by the user and group specified in User= and Group= . If the specified directories already exist and their owning user or group do not match the configured ones, all files and directories below the specified directories as well as the directories themselves will have their file ownership recursively changed to match what is configured. As an optimization, if the specified directories are already owned by the right user and group, files and directories below of them are left as-is, even if they do not match what is requested. The innermost specified directories will have their access mode adjusted to the what is specified in RuntimeDirectoryMode= , StateDirectoryMode= , CacheDirectoryMode= , LogsDirectoryMode= and ConfigurationDirectoryMode= .

These options imply BindPaths= for the specified paths. When combined with RootDirectory= or RootImage= these paths always reside on the host and are mounted from there into the unit’s file system namespace.

If DynamicUser= is used, the logic for CacheDirectory= , LogsDirectory= and StateDirectory= is slightly altered: the directories are created below /var/cache/private , /var/log/private and /var/lib/private , respectively, which are host directories made inaccessible to unprivileged users, which ensures that access to these directories cannot be gained through dynamic user ID recycling. Symbolic links are created to hide this difference in behaviour. Both from perspective of the host and from inside the unit, the relevant directories hence always appear directly below /var/cache , /var/log and /var/lib .

Use RuntimeDirectory= to manage one or more runtime directories for the unit and bind their lifetime to the daemon runtime. This is particularly useful for unprivileged daemons that cannot create runtime directories in /run/ due to lack of privileges, and to make sure the runtime directory is cleaned up automatically after use. For runtime directories that require more complex or different configuration or lifetime guarantees, please consider using tmpfiles.d (5) .

RuntimeDirectory= , StateDirectory= , CacheDirectory= and LogsDirectory= optionally support a second parameter, separated by » : «. The second parameter will be interpreted as a destination path that will be created as a symlink to the directory. The symlinks will be created after any BindPaths= or TemporaryFileSystem= options have been set up, to make ephemeral symlinking possible. The same source can have multiple symlinks, by using the same first parameter, but a different second parameter.

The directories defined by these options are always created under the standard paths used by systemd ( /var/ , /run/ , /etc/ , …). If the service needs directories in a different location, a different mechanism has to be used to create them.

tmpfiles.d (5) provides functionality that overlaps with these options. Using these options is recommended, because the lifetime of the directories is tied directly to the lifetime of the unit, and it is not necessary to ensure that the tmpfiles.d configuration is executed before the unit is started.

To remove any of the directories created by these settings, use the systemctl clean … command on the relevant units, see systemctl (1) for details.

Example: if a system service unit has the following,

RuntimeDirectory=foo/bar baz

the service manager creates /run/foo (if it does not exist), /run/foo/bar , and /run/baz . The directories /run/foo/bar and /run/baz except /run/foo are owned by the user and group specified in User= and Group= , and removed when the service is stopped.

Example: if a system service unit has the following,

RuntimeDirectory=foo/bar StateDirectory=aaa/bbb ccc

then the environment variable » RUNTIME_DIRECTORY » is set with » /run/foo/bar «, and » STATE_DIRECTORY » is set with » /var/lib/aaa/bbb:/var/lib/ccc «.

Example: if a system service unit has the following,

RuntimeDirectory=foo:bar foo:baz

the service manager creates /run/foo (if it does not exist), and /run/bar plus /run/baz as symlinks to /run/foo .

TimeoutCleanSec= systemctl clean … , see systemctl (1) for details. Takes the usual time values and defaults to infinity , i.e. by default no timeout is applied. If a timeout is configured the clean operation will be aborted forcibly when the timeout is reached, potentially leaving resources on disk.

ReadWritePaths= , ReadOnlyPaths= , InaccessiblePaths= , ExecPaths= , NoExecPaths= RootDirectory= / RootImage= .

Paths listed in ReadWritePaths= are accessible from within the namespace with the same access modes as from outside of it. Paths listed in ReadOnlyPaths= are accessible for reading only, writing will be refused even if the usual file access controls would permit this. Nest ReadWritePaths= inside of ReadOnlyPaths= in order to provide writable subdirectories within read-only directories. Use ReadWritePaths= in order to allow-list specific paths for write access if ProtectSystem=strict is used.

Paths listed in InaccessiblePaths= will be made inaccessible for processes inside the namespace along with everything below them in the file system hierarchy. This may be more restrictive than desired, because it is not possible to nest ReadWritePaths= , ReadOnlyPaths= , BindPaths= , or BindReadOnlyPaths= inside it. For a more flexible option, see TemporaryFileSystem= .

Content in paths listed in NoExecPaths= are not executable even if the usual file access controls would permit this. Nest ExecPaths= inside of NoExecPaths= in order to provide executable content within non-executable directories.

Non-directory paths may be specified as well. These options may be specified more than once, in which case all paths listed will have limited access from within the namespace. If the empty string is assigned to this option, the specific list is reset, and all prior assignments have no effect.

Paths in ReadWritePaths= , ReadOnlyPaths= , InaccessiblePaths= , ExecPaths= and NoExecPaths= may be prefixed with » — «, in which case they will be ignored when they do not exist. If prefixed with » + » the paths are taken relative to the root directory of the unit, as configured with RootDirectory= / RootImage= , instead of relative to the root directory of the host (see above). When combining » — » and » + » on the same path make sure to specify » — » first, and » + » second.

Note that these settings will disconnect propagation of mounts from the unit’s processes to the host. This means that this setting may not be used for services which shall be able to install mount points in the main mount namespace. For ReadWritePaths= and ReadOnlyPaths= , propagation in the other direction is not affected, i.e. mounts created on the host generally appear in the unit processes’ namespace, and mounts removed on the host also disappear there too. In particular, note that mount propagation from host to unit will result in unmodified mounts to be created in the unit’s namespace, i.e. writable mounts appearing on the host will be writable in the unit’s namespace too, even when propagated below a path marked with ReadOnlyPaths= ! Restricting access with these options hence does not extend to submounts of a directory that are created later on. This means the lock-down offered by that setting is not complete, and does not offer full protection.

Note that the effect of these settings may be undone by privileged processes. In order to set up an effective sandboxed environment for a unit it is thus recommended to combine these settings with either CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_ADMIN or SystemCallFilter=~@mount .

Simple allow-list example using these directives:

[Service] ReadOnlyPaths=/ ReadWritePaths=/var /run InaccessiblePaths=-/lost+found NoExecPaths=/ ExecPaths=/usr/sbin/my_daemon /usr/lib /usr/lib64

These options are only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

This is useful to hide files or directories not relevant to the processes invoked by the unit, while necessary files or directories can be still accessed by combining with BindPaths= or BindReadOnlyPaths= :

Example: if a unit has the following,

TemporaryFileSystem=/var:ro BindReadOnlyPaths=/var/lib/systemd

then the invoked processes by the unit cannot see any files or directories under /var/ except for /var/lib/systemd or its contents.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

Note that the implementation of this setting might be impossible (for example if mount namespaces are not available), and the unit should be written in a way that does not solely rely on this setting for security.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

Enabling this option will install a system call filter to block low-level I/O system calls that are grouped in the @raw-io set, remove CAP_MKNOD and CAP_SYS_RAWIO from the capability bounding set for the unit, and set DevicePolicy=closed (see systemd.resource-control (5) for details). Note that using this setting will disconnect propagation of mounts from the service to the host (propagation in the opposite direction continues to work). This means that this setting may not be used for services which shall be able to install mount points in the main mount namespace. The new /dev/ will be mounted read-only and ‘noexec’. The latter may break old programs which try to set up executable memory by using mmap (2) of /dev/zero instead of using MAP_ANON . For this setting the same restrictions regarding mount propagation and privileges apply as for ReadOnlyPaths= and related calls, see above. If turned on and if running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (e.g. setting User= ), NoNewPrivileges=yes is implied.

Note that the implementation of this setting might be impossible (for example if mount namespaces are not available), and the unit should be written in a way that does not solely rely on this setting for security.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

When access to some but not all devices must be possible, the DeviceAllow= setting might be used instead. See systemd.resource-control (5) .

PrivateNetwork= lo » inside it. No other network devices will be available to the executed process. This is useful to turn off network access by the executed process. Defaults to false. It is possible to run two or more units within the same private network namespace by using the JoinsNamespaceOf= directive, see systemd.unit (5) for details. Note that this option will disconnect all socket families from the host, including AF_NETLINK and AF_UNIX . Effectively, for AF_NETLINK this means that device configuration events received from systemd-udevd.service (8) are not delivered to the unit’s processes. And for AF_UNIX this has the effect that AF_UNIX sockets in the abstract socket namespace of the host will become unavailable to the unit’s processes (however, those located in the file system will continue to be accessible).

Note that the implementation of this setting might be impossible (for example if network namespaces are not available), and the unit should be written in a way that does not solely rely on this setting for security.

When this option is enabled, PrivateMounts= is implied unless it is explicitly disabled, and /sys will be remounted to associate it with the new network namespace.

When this option is used on a socket unit any sockets bound on behalf of this unit will be bound within a private network namespace. This may be combined with JoinsNamespaceOf= to listen on sockets inside of network namespaces of other services.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

When this option is enabled, PrivateMounts= is implied unless it is explicitly disabled, and /sys will be remounted to associate it with the new network namespace.

When this option is used on a socket unit any sockets bound on behalf of this unit will be bound within the specified network namespace.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

Note that IPC namespacing does not have an effect on AF_UNIX sockets, which are the most common form of IPC used on Linux. Instead, AF_UNIX sockets in the file system are subject to mount namespacing, and those in the abstract namespace are subject to network namespacing. IPC namespacing only has an effect on SysV IPC (which is mostly legacy) as well as POSIX message queues (for which AF_UNIX / SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets are typically a better replacement). IPC namespacing also has no effect on POSIX shared memory (which is subject to mount namespacing) either. See ipc_namespaces (7) for the details.

Note that the implementation of this setting might be impossible (for example if IPC namespaces are not available), and the unit should be written in a way that does not solely rely on this setting for security.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

MemoryKSM= Kernel Samepage Merging in the kernel documentation.

Note that this functionality might not be available, for example if KSM is disabled in the kernel, or the kernel doesn’t support controlling KSM at the process level through prctl() .

When this setting is set up by a per-user instance of the service manager, the mapping of the » root » user and group to itself is omitted (unless the user manager is root). Additionally, in the per-user instance manager case, the user namespace will be set up before most other namespaces. This means that combining PrivateUsers= true with other namespaces will enable use of features not normally supported by the per-user instances of the service manager.

This setting is particularly useful in conjunction with RootDirectory= / RootImage= , as the need to synchronize the user and group databases in the root directory and on the host is reduced, as the only users and groups who need to be matched are » root «, » nobody » and the unit’s own user and group.

Note that the implementation of this setting might be impossible (for example if user namespaces are not available), and the unit should be written in a way that does not solely rely on this setting for security.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

It is recommended to turn this on for most services that do not need modify the clock or check its state.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

ProtectKernelTunables= /proc/sys/ , /sys/ , /proc/sysrq-trigger , /proc/latency_stats , /proc/acpi , /proc/timer_stats , /proc/fs and /proc/irq will be made read-only to all processes of the unit. Usually, tunable kernel variables should be initialized only at boot-time, for example with the sysctl.d (5) mechanism. Few services need to write to these at runtime; it is hence recommended to turn this on for most services. For this setting the same restrictions regarding mount propagation and privileges apply as for ReadOnlyPaths= and related calls, see above. Defaults to off. If this setting is on, but the unit doesn’t have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (e.g. services for which User= is set), NoNewPrivileges=yes is implied. Note that this option does not prevent indirect changes to kernel tunables effected by IPC calls to other processes. However, InaccessiblePaths= may be used to make relevant IPC file system objects inaccessible. If ProtectKernelTunables= is set, MountAPIVFS=yes is implied.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

ProtectKernelLogs= CAP_SYSLOG from the capability bounding set for this unit, and installs a system call filter to block the syslog (2) system call (not to be confused with the libc API syslog (3) for userspace logging). The kernel exposes its log buffer to userspace via /dev/kmsg and /proc/kmsg . If enabled, these are made inaccessible to all the processes in the unit. If this setting is on, but the unit doesn’t have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (e.g. services for which User= is set), NoNewPrivileges=yes is implied.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

ProtectControlGroups= cgroups (7) ) hierarchies accessible through /sys/fs/cgroup/ will be made read-only to all processes of the unit. Except for container managers no services should require write access to the control groups hierarchies; it is hence recommended to turn this on for most services. For this setting the same restrictions regarding mount propagation and privileges apply as for ReadOnlyPaths= and related calls, see above. Defaults to off. If ProtectControlGroups= is set, MountAPIVFS=yes is implied.

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

RestrictAddressFamilies= none «, or a space-separated list of address family names to allow-list, such as AF_UNIX , AF_INET or AF_INET6 . When » none » is specified, then all address families will be denied. When prefixed with » ~ » the listed address families will be applied as deny list, otherwise as allow list. Note that this restricts access to the socket (2) system call only. Sockets passed into the process by other means (for example, by using socket activation with socket units, see systemd.socket (5) ) are unaffected. Also, sockets created with socketpair() (which creates connected AF_UNIX sockets only) are unaffected. Note that this option has no effect on 32-bit x86, s390, s390x, mips, mips-le, ppc, ppc-le, ppc64, ppc64-le and is ignored (but works correctly on other ABIs, including x86-64). Note that on systems supporting multiple ABIs (such as x86/x86-64) it is recommended to turn off alternative ABIs for services, so that they cannot be used to circumvent the restrictions of this option. Specifically, it is recommended to combine this option with SystemCallArchitectures=native or similar. If running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (e.g. setting User= ), NoNewPrivileges=yes is implied. By default, no restrictions apply, all address families are accessible to processes. If assigned the empty string, any previous address family restriction changes are undone. This setting does not affect commands prefixed with » + «.

Use this option to limit exposure of processes to remote access, in particular via exotic and sensitive network protocols, such as AF_PACKET . Note that in most cases, the local AF_UNIX address family should be included in the configured allow list as it is frequently used for local communication, including for syslog (2) logging.

If you specify both types of this option (i.e. allow-listing and deny-listing), the first encountered will take precedence and will dictate the default action (allow access to the filesystem or deny it). Then the next occurrences of this option will add or delete the listed filesystems from the set of the restricted filesystems, depending on its type and the default action.

Example: if a unit has the following,

RestrictFileSystems=ext4 tmpfs RestrictFileSystems=ext2 ext4

then access to ext4 , tmpfs , and ext2 is allowed and access to other filesystems is denied.

Example: if a unit has the following,

RestrictFileSystems=ext4 tmpfs RestrictFileSystems=~ext4

then only access tmpfs is allowed.

Example: if a unit has the following,

RestrictFileSystems=~ext4 tmpfs RestrictFileSystems=ext4

then only access to tmpfs is denied.

As the number of possible filesystems is large, predefined sets of filesystems are provided. A set starts with » @ » character, followed by name of the set.

Table 3. Currently predefined filesystem sets

Set Description
@basic-api Basic filesystem API.
@auxiliary-api Auxiliary filesystem API.
@common-block Common block device filesystems.
@historical-block Historical block device filesystems.
@network Well-known network filesystems.
@privileged-api Privileged filesystem API.
@temporary Temporary filesystems: tmpfs, ramfs.
@known All known filesystems defined by the kernel. This list is defined statically in systemd based on a kernel version that was available when this systemd version was released. It will become progressively more out-of-date as the kernel is updated.

Use systemd-analyze (1) ‘s filesystems command to retrieve a list of filesystems defined on the local system.

Note that this setting might not be supported on some systems (for example if the LSM eBPF hook is not enabled in the underlying kernel or if not using the unified control group hierarchy). In that case this setting has no effect.

This option cannot be bypassed by prefixing » + » to the executable path in the service unit, as it applies to the whole control group.

RestrictNamespaces= namespaces (7) . Either takes a boolean argument, or a space-separated list of namespace type identifiers. If false (the default), no restrictions on namespace creation and switching are made. If true, access to any kind of namespacing is prohibited. Otherwise, a space-separated list of namespace type identifiers must be specified, consisting of any combination of: cgroup , ipc , net , mnt , pid , user and uts . Any namespace type listed is made accessible to the unit’s processes, access to namespace types not listed is prohibited (allow-listing). By prepending the list with a single tilde character (» ~ «) the effect may be inverted: only the listed namespace types will be made inaccessible, all unlisted ones are permitted (deny-listing). If the empty string is assigned, the default namespace restrictions are applied, which is equivalent to false. This option may appear more than once, in which case the namespace types are merged by OR , or by AND if the lines are prefixed with » ~ » (see examples below). Internally, this setting limits access to the unshare (2) , clone (2) and setns (2) system calls, taking the specified flags parameters into account. Note that — if this option is used — in addition to restricting creation and switching of the specified types of namespaces (or all of them, if true) access to the setns() system call with a zero flags parameter is prohibited. This setting is only supported on x86, x86-64, mips, mips-le, mips64, mips64-le, mips64-n32, mips64-le-n32, ppc64, ppc64-le, s390 and s390x, and enforces no restrictions on other architectures. If running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (e.g. setting User= ), NoNewPrivileges=yes is implied.

Example: if a unit has the following,

RestrictNamespaces=cgroup ipc RestrictNamespaces=cgroup net

then cgroup , ipc , and net are set. If the second line is prefixed with » ~ «, e.g.,

RestrictNamespaces=cgroup ipc RestrictNamespaces=~cgroup net

then, only ipc is set.

LockPersonality= personality (2) system call so that the kernel execution domain may not be changed from the default or the personality selected with Personality= directive. This may be useful to improve security, because odd personality emulations may be poorly tested and source of vulnerabilities. If running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (e.g. setting User= ), NoNewPrivileges=yes is implied.

MemoryDenyWriteExecute= prctl (2) ) that rejects mmap (2) system calls with both PROT_EXEC and PROT_WRITE set, mprotect (2) or pkey_mprotect (2) system calls with PROT_EXEC set and shmat (2) system calls with SHM_EXEC set. Note that this option is incompatible with programs and libraries that generate program code dynamically at runtime, including JIT execution engines, executable stacks, and code «trampoline» feature of various C compilers. This option improves service security, as it makes harder for software exploits to change running code dynamically. However, the protection can be circumvented, if the service can write to a filesystem, which is not mounted with noexec (such as /dev/shm ), or it can use memfd_create() . This can be prevented by making such file systems inaccessible to the service (e.g. InaccessiblePaths=/dev/shm ) and installing further system call filters ( SystemCallFilter=~memfd_create ). Note that this feature is fully available on x86-64, and partially on x86. Specifically, the shmat() protection is not available on x86. Note that on systems supporting multiple ABIs (such as x86/x86-64) it is recommended to turn off alternative ABIs for services, so that they cannot be used to circumvent the restrictions of this option. Specifically, it is recommended to combine this option with SystemCallArchitectures=native or similar. If running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (e.g. setting User= ), NoNewPrivileges=yes is implied.

RestrictRealtime= SCHED_FIFO , SCHED_RR or SCHED_DEADLINE . See sched (7) for details about these scheduling policies. If running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (e.g. setting User= ), NoNewPrivileges=yes is implied. Realtime scheduling policies may be used to monopolize CPU time for longer periods of time, and may hence be used to lock up or otherwise trigger Denial-of-Service situations on the system. It is hence recommended to restrict access to realtime scheduling to the few programs that actually require them. Defaults to off.

RestrictSUIDSGID= inode (7) ). If running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (e.g. setting User= ), NoNewPrivileges=yes is implied. As the SUID/SGID bits are mechanisms to elevate privileges, and allow users to acquire the identity of other users, it is recommended to restrict creation of SUID/SGID files to the few programs that actually require them. Note that this restricts marking of any type of file system object with these bits, including both regular files and directories (where the SGID is a different meaning than for files, see documentation). This option is implied if DynamicUser= is enabled. Defaults to off.

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

PrivateMounts= mount_namespaces (7) for details on file system namespaces. Defaults to off.

When turned on, this executes three operations for each invoked process: a new CLONE_NEWNS namespace is created, after which all existing mounts are remounted to MS_SLAVE to disable propagation from the unit’s processes to the host (but leaving propagation in the opposite direction in effect). Finally, the mounts are remounted again to the propagation mode configured with MountFlags= , see below.

File system namespaces are set up individually for each process forked off by the service manager. Mounts established in the namespace of the process created by ExecStartPre= will hence be cleaned up automatically as soon as that process exits and will not be available to subsequent processes forked off for ExecStart= (and similar applies to the various other commands configured for units). Similarly, JoinsNamespaceOf= does not permit sharing kernel mount namespaces between units, it only enables sharing of the /tmp/ and /var/tmp/ directories.

Other file system namespace unit settings — PrivateMounts= , PrivateTmp= , PrivateDevices= , ProtectSystem= , ProtectHome= , ReadOnlyPaths= , InaccessiblePaths= , ReadWritePaths= , … — also enable file system namespacing in a fashion equivalent to this option. Hence it is primarily useful to explicitly request this behaviour if none of the other settings are used.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

This setting only controls the final propagation setting in effect on all mount points of the file system namespace created for each process of this unit. Other file system namespacing unit settings (see the discussion in PrivateMounts= above) will implicitly disable mount and unmount propagation from the unit’s processes towards the host by changing the propagation setting of all mount points in the unit’s file system namespace to slave first. Setting this option to shared does not reestablish propagation in that case.

If not set – but file system namespaces are enabled through another file system namespace unit setting – shared mount propagation is used, but — as mentioned — as slave is applied first, propagation from the unit’s processes to the host is still turned off.

It is not recommended to use private mount propagation for units, as this means temporary mounts (such as removable media) of the host will stay mounted and thus indefinitely busy in forked off processes, as unmount propagation events won’t be received by the file system namespace of the unit.

Usually, it is best to leave this setting unmodified, and use higher level file system namespacing options instead, in particular PrivateMounts= , see above.

This option is only available for system services, or for services running in per-user instances of the service manager in which case PrivateUsers= is implicitly enabled (requires unprivileged user namespaces support to be enabled in the kernel via the » kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone= » sysctl).

System Call Filtering¶

SystemCallFilter= SIGSYS signal (allow-listing). (See SystemCallErrorNumber= below for changing the default action). If the first character of the list is » ~ «, the effect is inverted: only the listed system calls will result in immediate process termination (deny-listing). Deny-listed system calls and system call groups may optionally be suffixed with a colon (» : «) and » errno » error number (between 0 and 4095) or errno name such as EPERM , EACCES or EUCLEAN (see errno (3) for a full list). This value will be returned when a deny-listed system call is triggered, instead of terminating the processes immediately. Special setting » kill » can be used to explicitly specify killing. This value takes precedence over the one given in SystemCallErrorNumber= , see below. If running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (e.g. setting User= ), NoNewPrivileges=yes is implied. This feature makes use of the Secure Computing Mode 2 interfaces of the kernel (‘seccomp filtering’) and is useful for enforcing a minimal sandboxing environment. Note that the execve() , exit() , exit_group() , getrlimit() , rt_sigreturn() , sigreturn() system calls and the system calls for querying time and sleeping are implicitly allow-listed and do not need to be listed explicitly. This option may be specified more than once, in which case the filter masks are merged. If the empty string is assigned, the filter is reset, all prior assignments will have no effect. This does not affect commands prefixed with » + «.

Note that on systems supporting multiple ABIs (such as x86/x86-64) it is recommended to turn off alternative ABIs for services, so that they cannot be used to circumvent the restrictions of this option. Specifically, it is recommended to combine this option with SystemCallArchitectures=native or similar.

Note that strict system call filters may impact execution and error handling code paths of the service invocation. Specifically, access to the execve() system call is required for the execution of the service binary — if it is blocked service invocation will necessarily fail. Also, if execution of the service binary fails for some reason (for example: missing service executable), the error handling logic might require access to an additional set of system calls in order to process and log this failure correctly. It might be necessary to temporarily disable system call filters in order to simplify debugging of such failures.

If you specify both types of this option (i.e. allow-listing and deny-listing), the first encountered will take precedence and will dictate the default action (termination or approval of a system call). Then the next occurrences of this option will add or delete the listed system calls from the set of the filtered system calls, depending of its type and the default action. (For example, if you have started with an allow list rule for read() and write() , and right after it add a deny list rule for write() , then write() will be removed from the set.)

As the number of possible system calls is large, predefined sets of system calls are provided. A set starts with » @ » character, followed by name of the set.

Table 4. Currently predefined system call sets

Set Description
@aio Asynchronous I/O ( io_setup (2) , io_submit (2) , and related calls)
@basic-io System calls for basic I/O: reading, writing, seeking, file descriptor duplication and closing ( read (2) , write (2) , and related calls)
@chown Changing file ownership ( chown (2) , fchownat (2) , and related calls)
@clock System calls for changing the system clock ( adjtimex (2) , settimeofday (2) , and related calls)
@cpu-emulation System calls for CPU emulation functionality ( vm86 (2) and related calls)
@debug Debugging, performance monitoring and tracing functionality ( ptrace (2) , perf_event_open (2) and related calls)
@file-system File system operations: opening, creating files and directories for read and write, renaming and removing them, reading file properties, or creating hard and symbolic links
@io-event Event loop system calls ( poll (2) , select (2) , epoll (7) , eventfd (2) and related calls)
@ipc Pipes, SysV IPC, POSIX Message Queues and other IPC ( mq_overview (7) , svipc (7) )
@keyring Kernel keyring access ( keyctl (2) and related calls)
@memlock Locking of memory in RAM ( mlock (2) , mlockall (2) and related calls)
@module Loading and unloading of kernel modules ( init_module (2) , delete_module (2) and related calls)
@mount Mounting and unmounting of file systems ( mount (2) , chroot (2) , and related calls)
@network-io Socket I/O (including local AF_UNIX): socket (7) , unix (7)
@obsolete Unusual, obsolete or unimplemented ( create_module (2) , gtty (2) , …)
@pkey System calls that deal with memory protection keys ( pkeys (7) )
@privileged All system calls which need super-user capabilities ( capabilities (7) )
@process Process control, execution, namespacing operations ( clone (2) , kill (2) , namespaces (7) , …)
@raw-io Raw I/O port access ( ioperm (2) , iopl (2) , pciconfig_read() , …)
@reboot System calls for rebooting and reboot preparation ( reboot (2) , kexec() , …)
@resources System calls for changing resource limits, memory and scheduling parameters ( setrlimit (2) , setpriority (2) , …)
@sandbox System calls for sandboxing programs ( seccomp (2) , Landlock system calls, …)
@setuid System calls for changing user ID and group ID credentials, ( setuid (2) , setgid (2) , setresuid (2) , …)
@signal System calls for manipulating and handling process signals ( signal (2) , sigprocmask (2) , …)
@swap System calls for enabling/disabling swap devices ( swapon (2) , swapoff (2) )
@sync Synchronizing files and memory to disk ( fsync (2) , msync (2) , and related calls)
@system-service A reasonable set of system calls used by common system services, excluding any special purpose calls. This is the recommended starting point for allow-listing system calls for system services, as it contains what is typically needed by system services, but excludes overly specific interfaces. For example, the following APIs are excluded: » @clock «, » @mount «, » @swap «, » @reboot «.
@timer System calls for scheduling operations by time ( alarm (2) , timer_create (2) , …)
@known All system calls defined by the kernel. This list is defined statically in systemd based on a kernel version that was available when this systemd version was released. It will become progressively more out-of-date as the kernel is updated.

Note, that as new system calls are added to the kernel, additional system calls might be added to the groups above. Contents of the sets may also change between systemd versions. In addition, the list of system calls depends on the kernel version and architecture for which systemd was compiled. Use systemd-analyze syscall-filter to list the actual list of system calls in each filter.

Generally, allow-listing system calls (rather than deny-listing) is the safer mode of operation. It is recommended to enforce system call allow lists for all long-running system services. Specifically, the following lines are a relatively safe basic choice for the majority of system services:

[Service] SystemCallFilter=@system-service SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM

Note that various kernel system calls are defined redundantly: there are multiple system calls for executing the same operation. For example, the pidfd_send_signal() system call may be used to execute operations similar to what can be done with the older kill() system call, hence blocking the latter without the former only provides weak protection. Since new system calls are added regularly to the kernel as development progresses, keeping system call deny lists comprehensive requires constant work. It is thus recommended to use allow-listing instead, which offers the benefit that new system calls are by default implicitly blocked until the allow list is updated.

Also note that a number of system calls are required to be accessible for the dynamic linker to work. The dynamic linker is required for running most regular programs (specifically: all dynamic ELF binaries, which is how most distributions build packaged programs). This means that blocking these system calls (which include open() , openat() or mmap() ) will make most programs typically shipped with generic distributions unusable.

It is recommended to combine the file system namespacing related options with SystemCallFilter=~@mount , in order to prohibit the unit’s processes to undo the mappings. Specifically these are the options PrivateTmp= , PrivateDevices= , ProtectSystem= , ProtectHome= , ProtectKernelTunables= , ProtectControlGroups= , ProtectKernelLogs= , ProtectClock= , ReadOnlyPaths= , InaccessiblePaths= and ReadWritePaths= .

SystemCallErrorNumber= errno » error number (between 1 and 4095) or errno name such as EPERM , EACCES or EUCLEAN , to return when the system call filter configured with SystemCallFilter= is triggered, instead of terminating the process immediately. See errno (3) for a full list of error codes. When this setting is not used, or when the empty string or the special setting » kill » is assigned, the process will be terminated immediately when the filter is triggered.

SystemCallArchitectures= ConditionArchitecture= described in systemd.unit (5) , as well as x32 , mips64-n32 , mips64-le-n32 , and the special identifier native . The special identifier native implicitly maps to the native architecture of the system (or more precisely: to the architecture the system manager is compiled for). If running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (e.g. setting User= ), NoNewPrivileges=yes is implied. By default, this option is set to the empty list, i.e. no filtering is applied.

If this setting is used, processes of this unit will only be permitted to call native system calls, and system calls of the specified architectures. For the purposes of this option, the x32 architecture is treated as including x86-64 system calls. However, this setting still fulfills its purpose, as explained below, on x32.

System call filtering is not equally effective on all architectures. For example, on x86 filtering of network socket-related calls is not possible, due to ABI limitations — a limitation that x86-64 does not have, however. On systems supporting multiple ABIs at the same time — such as x86/x86-64 — it is hence recommended to limit the set of permitted system call architectures so that secondary ABIs may not be used to circumvent the restrictions applied to the native ABI of the system. In particular, setting SystemCallArchitectures=native is a good choice for disabling non-native ABIs.

System call architectures may also be restricted system-wide via the SystemCallArchitectures= option in the global configuration. See systemd-system.conf (5) for details.

Environment¶

Environment= systemd.syntax (7) and becomes a list of variable assignments. If you need to assign a value containing spaces or the equals sign to a variable, put quotes around the whole assignment. Variable expansion is not performed inside the strings and the » $ » character has no special meaning. Specifier expansion is performed, see the «Specifiers» section in systemd.unit (5) .

This option may be specified more than once, in which case all listed variables will be set. If the same variable is listed twice, the later setting will override the earlier setting. If the empty string is assigned to this option, the list of environment variables is reset, all prior assignments have no effect.

The names of the variables can contain ASCII letters, digits, and the underscore character. Variable names cannot be empty or start with a digit. In variable values, most characters are allowed, but non-printable characters are currently rejected.

Environment="VAR1=word1 word2" VAR2=word3 "VAR3=$word 5 6"

gives three variables » VAR1 «, » VAR2 «, » VAR3 » with the values » word1 word2 «, » word3 «, » $word 5 6 «.

See environ (7) for details about environment variables.

Note that environment variables are not suitable for passing secrets (such as passwords, key material, …) to service processes. Environment variables set for a unit are exposed to unprivileged clients via D-Bus IPC, and generally not understood as being data that requires protection. Moreover, environment variables are propagated down the process tree, including across security boundaries (such as setuid/setgid executables), and hence might leak to processes that should not have access to the secret data. Use LoadCredential= , LoadCredentialEncrypted= or SetCredentialEncrypted= (see below) to pass data to unit processes securely.

In the file, an unquoted value after the » = » is parsed with the same backslash-escape rules as unquoted text in a POSIX shell, but unlike in a shell, interior whitespace is preserved and quotes after the first non-whitespace character are preserved. Leading and trailing whitespace (space, tab, carriage return) is discarded, but interior whitespace within the line is preserved verbatim. A line ending with a backslash will be continued to the following one, with the newline itself discarded. A backslash » \ » followed by any character other than newline will preserve the following character, so that » \\ » will become the value » \ «.

In the file, a » ‘ «-quoted value after the » = » can span multiple lines and contain any character verbatim other than single quote, like single-quoted text in a POSIX shell. No backslash-escape sequences are recognized. Leading and trailing whitespace outside of the single quotes is discarded.

In the file, a » » «-quoted value after the » = » can span multiple lines, and the same escape sequences are recognized as in double-quoted text of a POSIX shell. Backslash (» \ «) followed by any of » «\`$ » will preserve that character. A backslash followed by newline is a line continuation, and the newline itself is discarded. A backslash followed by any other character is ignored; both the backslash and the following character are preserved verbatim. Leading and trailing whitespace outside of the double quotes is discarded.

The argument passed should be an absolute filename or wildcard expression, optionally prefixed with » — «, which indicates that if the file does not exist, it will not be read and no error or warning message is logged. This option may be specified more than once in which case all specified files are read. If the empty string is assigned to this option, the list of file to read is reset, all prior assignments have no effect.

The files listed with this directive will be read shortly before the process is executed (more specifically, after all processes from a previous unit state terminated. This means you can generate these files in one unit state, and read it with this option in the next. The files are read from the file system of the service manager, before any file system changes like bind mounts take place).

Settings from these files override settings made with Environment= . If the same variable is set twice from these files, the files will be read in the order they are specified and the later setting will override the earlier setting.

PassEnvironment=VAR1 VAR2 VAR3

passes three variables » VAR1 «, » VAR2 «, » VAR3 » with the values set for those variables in PID1.

See environ (7) for details about environment variables.

See «Environment Variables in Spawned Processes» below for a description of how those settings combine to form the inherited environment. See environ (7) for general information about environment variables.

Logging and Standard Input/Output¶

StandardInput= null , tty , tty-force , tty-fail , data , file: path , socket or fd: name .

If null is selected, standard input will be connected to /dev/null , i.e. all read attempts by the process will result in immediate EOF.

If tty is selected, standard input is connected to a TTY (as configured by TTYPath= , see below) and the executed process becomes the controlling process of the terminal. If the terminal is already being controlled by another process, the executed process waits until the current controlling process releases the terminal.

tty-force is similar to tty , but the executed process is forcefully and immediately made the controlling process of the terminal, potentially removing previous controlling processes from the terminal.

tty-fail is similar to tty , but if the terminal already has a controlling process start-up of the executed process fails.

The data option may be used to configure arbitrary textual or binary data to pass via standard input to the executed process. The data to pass is configured via StandardInputText= / StandardInputData= (see below). Note that the actual file descriptor type passed (memory file, regular file, UNIX pipe, …) might depend on the kernel and available privileges. In any case, the file descriptor is read-only, and when read returns the specified data followed by EOF.

The file: path option may be used to connect a specific file system object to standard input. An absolute path following the » : » character is expected, which may refer to a regular file, a FIFO or special file. If an AF_UNIX socket in the file system is specified, a stream socket is connected to it. The latter is useful for connecting standard input of processes to arbitrary system services.

The socket option is valid in socket-activated services only, and requires the relevant socket unit file (see systemd.socket (5) for details) to have Accept=yes set, or to specify a single socket only. If this option is set, standard input will be connected to the socket the service was activated from, which is primarily useful for compatibility with daemons designed for use with the traditional inetd (8) socket activation daemon.

The fd: name option connects standard input to a specific, named file descriptor provided by a socket unit. The name may be specified as part of this option, following a » : » character (e.g. » fd:foobar «). If no name is specified, the name » stdin » is implied (i.e. » fd » is equivalent to » fd:stdin «). At least one socket unit defining the specified name must be provided via the Sockets= option, and the file descriptor name may differ from the name of its containing socket unit. If multiple matches are found, the first one will be used. See FileDescriptorName= in systemd.socket (5) for more details about named file descriptors and their ordering.

This setting defaults to null , unless StandardInputText= / StandardInputData= are set, in which case it defaults to data .

inherit duplicates the file descriptor of standard input for standard output.

null connects standard output to /dev/null , i.e. everything written to it will be lost.

tty connects standard output to a tty (as configured via TTYPath= , see below). If the TTY is used for output only, the executed process will not become the controlling process of the terminal, and will not fail or wait for other processes to release the terminal.

journal connects standard output with the journal, which is accessible via journalctl (1) . Note that everything that is written to kmsg (see below) is implicitly stored in the journal as well, the specific option listed below is hence a superset of this one. (Also note that any external, additional syslog daemons receive their log data from the journal, too, hence this is the option to use when logging shall be processed with such a daemon.)

kmsg connects standard output with the kernel log buffer which is accessible via dmesg (1) , in addition to the journal. The journal daemon might be configured to send all logs to kmsg anyway, in which case this option is no different from journal .

journal+console and kmsg+console work in a similar way as the two options above but copy the output to the system console as well.

The file: path option may be used to connect a specific file system object to standard output. The semantics are similar to the same option of StandardInput= , see above. If path refers to a regular file on the filesystem, it is opened (created if it doesn’t exist yet) for writing at the beginning of the file, but without truncating it. If standard input and output are directed to the same file path, it is opened only once — for reading as well as writing — and duplicated. This is particularly useful when the specified path refers to an AF_UNIX socket in the file system, as in that case only a single stream connection is created for both input and output.

append: path is similar to file: path above, but it opens the file in append mode.

truncate: path is similar to file: path above, but it truncates the file when opening it. For units with multiple command lines, e.g. Type=oneshot services with multiple ExecStart= , or services with ExecCondition= , ExecStartPre= or ExecStartPost= , the output file is reopened and therefore re-truncated for each command line. If the output file is truncated while another process still has the file open, e.g. by an ExecReload= running concurrently with an ExecStart= , and the other process continues writing to the file without adjusting its offset, then the space between the file pointers of the two processes may be filled with NUL bytes, producing a sparse file. Thus, truncate: path is typically only useful for units where only one process runs at a time, such as services with a single ExecStart= and no ExecStartPost= , ExecReload= , ExecStop= or similar.

socket connects standard output to a socket acquired via socket activation. The semantics are similar to the same option of StandardInput= , see above.

The fd: name option connects standard output to a specific, named file descriptor provided by a socket unit. A name may be specified as part of this option, following a » : » character (e.g. » fd: foobar «). If no name is specified, the name » stdout » is implied (i.e. » fd » is equivalent to » fd:stdout «). At least one socket unit defining the specified name must be provided via the Sockets= option, and the file descriptor name may differ from the name of its containing socket unit. If multiple matches are found, the first one will be used. See FileDescriptorName= in systemd.socket (5) for more details about named descriptors and their ordering.

If the standard output (or error output, see below) of a unit is connected to the journal or the kernel log buffer, the unit will implicitly gain a dependency of type After= on systemd-journald.socket (also see the «Implicit Dependencies» section above). Also note that in this case stdout (or stderr, see below) will be an AF_UNIX stream socket, and not a pipe or FIFO that can be re-opened. This means when executing shell scripts the construct echo «hello» > /dev/stderr for writing text to stderr will not work. To mitigate this use the construct echo «hello» >&2 instead, which is mostly equivalent and avoids this pitfall.

If StandardInput= is set to one of tty , tty-force , tty-fail , socket , or fd: name , this setting defaults to inherit .

In other cases, this setting defaults to the value set with DefaultStandardOutput= in systemd-system.conf (5) , which defaults to journal . Note that setting this parameter might result in additional dependencies to be added to the unit (see above).

This setting defaults to the value set with DefaultStandardError= in systemd-system.conf (5) , which defaults to inherit . Note that setting this parameter might result in additional dependencies to be added to the unit (see above).

StandardInputText= accepts arbitrary textual data. C-style escapes for special characters as well as the usual » % «-specifiers are resolved. Each time this setting is used the specified text is appended to the per-unit data buffer, followed by a newline character (thus every use appends a new line to the end of the buffer). Note that leading and trailing whitespace of lines configured with this option is removed. If an empty line is specified the buffer is cleared (hence, in order to insert an empty line, add an additional » \n » to the end or beginning of a line).

StandardInputData= accepts arbitrary binary data, encoded in Base64. No escape sequences or specifiers are resolved. Any whitespace in the encoded version is ignored during decoding.

Note that StandardInputText= and StandardInputData= operate on the same data buffer, and may be mixed in order to configure both binary and textual data for the same input stream. The textual or binary data is joined strictly in the order the settings appear in the unit file. Assigning an empty string to either will reset the data buffer.

Please keep in mind that in order to maintain readability long unit file settings may be split into multiple lines, by suffixing each line (except for the last) with a » \ » character (see systemd.unit (5) for details). This is particularly useful for large data configured with these two options. Example:

… StandardInput=data StandardInputData=V2XigLJyZSBubyBzdHJhbmdlcnMgdG8gbG92ZQpZb3Uga25vdyB0aGUgcnVsZXMgYW5kIHNvIGRv \ IEkKQSBmdWxsIGNvbW1pdG1lbnQncyB3aGF0IEnigLJtIHRoaW5raW5nIG9mCllvdSB3b3VsZG4n \ dCBnZXQgdGhpcyBmcm9tIGFueSBvdGhlciBndXkKSSBqdXN0IHdhbm5hIHRlbGwgeW91IGhvdyBJ \ J20gZmVlbGluZwpHb3R0YSBtYWtlIHlvdSB1bmRlcnN0YW5kCgpOZXZlciBnb25uYSBnaXZlIHlv \ dSB1cApOZXZlciBnb25uYSBsZXQgeW91IGRvd24KTmV2ZXIgZ29ubmEgcnVuIGFyb3VuZCBhbmQg \ ZGVzZXJ0IHlvdQpOZXZlciBnb25uYSBtYWtlIHlvdSBjcnkKTmV2ZXIgZ29ubmEgc2F5IGdvb2Ri \ eWUKTmV2ZXIgZ29ubmEgdGVsbCBhIGxpZSBhbmQgaHVydCB5b3UK …

LogLevelMax= syslog log level, one of emerg (lowest log level, only highest priority messages), alert , crit , err , warning , notice , info , debug (highest log level, also lowest priority messages). See syslog (3) for details. By default no filtering is applied (i.e. the default maximum log level is debug ). Use this option to configure the logging system to drop log messages of a specific service above the specified level. For example, set LogLevelMax= info in order to turn off debug logging of a particularly chatty unit. Note that the configured level is applied to any log messages written by any of the processes belonging to this unit, as well as any log messages written by the system manager process (PID 1) in reference to this unit, sent via any supported logging protocol. The filtering is applied early in the logging pipeline, before any kind of further processing is done. Moreover, messages which pass through this filter successfully might still be dropped by filters applied at a later stage in the logging subsystem. For example, MaxLevelStore= configured in journald.conf (5) might prohibit messages of higher log levels to be stored on disk, even though the per-unit LogLevelMax= permitted it to be processed.

LogExtraFields= FIELD=VALUE » separated by whitespace. See systemd.journal-fields (7) for details on the journal field concept. Even though the underlying journal implementation permits binary field values, this setting accepts only valid UTF-8 values. To include space characters in a journal field value, enclose the assignment in double quotes («). The usual specifiers are expanded in all assignments (see below). Note that this setting is not only useful for attaching additional metadata to log records of a unit, but given that all fields and values are indexed may also be used to implement cross-unit log record matching. Assign an empty string to reset the list.

LogRateLimitIntervalSec= , LogRateLimitBurst= LogRateLimitIntervalSec= , more messages than specified in LogRateLimitBurst= are logged by a service, all further messages within the interval are dropped until the interval is over. A message about the number of dropped messages is generated. The time specification for LogRateLimitIntervalSec= may be specified in the following units: «s», «min», «h», «ms», «us». See systemd.time (7) for details. The default settings are set by RateLimitIntervalSec= and RateLimitBurst= configured in journald.conf (5) . Note that this only applies to log messages that are processed by the logging subsystem, i.e. by systemd-journald.service (8) This means that if you connect a service’s stderr directly to a file via StandardOutput=file:… or a similar setting, the rate limiting will not be applied to messages written that way (but it will be enforced for messages generated via syslog (3) and similar functions).

Because the » ~ » character is used to define denied patterns, it must be replaced with » \x7e » to allow a message starting with » ~ «. For example, » ~foobar » would add a pattern matching » foobar » to the deny list, while » \x7efoobar » would add a pattern matching » ~foobar » to the allow list.

Log messages are tested against denied patterns (if any), then against allowed patterns (if any). If a log message matches any of the denied patterns, it will be discarded, whatever the allowed patterns. Then, remaining log messages are tested against allowed patterns. Messages matching against none of the allowed pattern are discarded. If no allowed patterns are defined, then all messages are processed directly after going through denied filters.

Filtering is based on the unit for which LogFilterPatterns= is defined, meaning log messages coming from systemd (1) about the unit are not taken into account. Filtered log messages won’t be forwarded to traditional syslog daemons, the kernel log buffer (kmsg), the systemd console, or sent as wall messages to all logged-in users.

Internally, journal namespaces are implemented through Linux mount namespacing and over-mounting the directory that contains the relevant AF_UNIX sockets used for logging in the unit’s mount namespace. Since mount namespaces are used this setting disconnects propagation of mounts from the unit’s processes to the host, similarly to how ReadOnlyPaths= and similar settings describe above work. Journal namespaces may hence not be used for services that need to establish mount points on the host.

When this option is used the unit will automatically gain ordering and requirement dependencies on the two socket units associated with the systemd-journald@.service instance so that they are automatically established prior to the unit starting up. Note that when this option is used log output of this service does not appear in the regular journalctl (1) output, unless the —namespace= option is used.

This option is only available for system services and is not supported for services running in per-user instances of the service manager.

SyslogFacility= syslog facility identifier to use when logging. One of kern , user , mail , daemon , auth , syslog , lpr , news , uucp , cron , authpriv , ftp , local0 , local1 , local2 , local3 , local4 , local5 , local6 or local7 . See syslog (3) for details. This option is only useful when StandardOutput= or StandardError= are set to journal or kmsg (or to the same settings in combination with +console ), and only applies to log messages written to stdout or stderr. Defaults to daemon .

SyslogLevel= syslog log level to use when logging to the logging system or the kernel log buffer. One of emerg , alert , crit , err , warning , notice , info , debug . See syslog (3) for details. This option is only useful when StandardOutput= or StandardError= are set to journal or kmsg (or to the same settings in combination with +console ), and only applies to log messages written to stdout or stderr. Note that individual lines output by executed processes may be prefixed with a different log level which can be used to override the default log level specified here. The interpretation of these prefixes may be disabled with SyslogLevelPrefix= , see below. For details, see sd-daemon (3) . Defaults to info .

Credentials¶

LoadCredential= ID [ : PATH ], LoadCredentialEncrypted= ID [ : PATH ] ¶

Pass a credential to the unit. Credentials are limited-size binary or textual objects that may be passed to unit processes. They are primarily used for passing cryptographic keys (both public and private) or certificates, user account information or identity information from host to services. The data is accessible from the unit’s processes via the file system, at a read-only location that (if possible and permitted) is backed by non-swappable memory. The data is only accessible to the user associated with the unit, via the User= / DynamicUser= settings (as well as the superuser). When available, the location of credentials is exported as the $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY environment variable to the unit’s processes.

The LoadCredential= setting takes a textual ID to use as name for a credential plus a file system path, separated by a colon. The ID must be a short ASCII string suitable as filename in the filesystem, and may be chosen freely by the user. If the specified path is absolute it is opened as regular file and the credential data is read from it. If the absolute path refers to an AF_UNIX stream socket in the file system a connection is made to it (only once at unit start-up) and the credential data read from the connection, providing an easy IPC integration point for dynamically transferring credentials from other services.

If the specified path is not absolute and itself qualifies as valid credential identifier it is attempted to find a credential that the service manager itself received under the specified name — which may be used to propagate credentials from an invoking environment (e.g. a container manager that invoked the service manager) into a service. If no matching system credential is found, the directories /etc/credstore/ , /run/credstore/ and /usr/lib/credstore/ are searched for files under the credential’s name — which hence are recommended locations for credential data on disk. If LoadCredentialEncrypted= is used /run/credstore.encrypted/ , /etc/credstore.encrypted/ , and /usr/lib/credstore.encrypted/ are searched as well.

If the file system path is omitted it is chosen identical to the credential name, i.e. this is a terse way to declare credentials to inherit from the service manager into a service. This option may be used multiple times, each time defining an additional credential to pass to the unit.

If an absolute path referring to a directory is specified, every file in that directory (recursively) will be loaded as a separate credential. The ID for each credential will be the provided ID suffixed with » _$FILENAME » (e.g., » Key_file1 «). When loading from a directory, symlinks will be ignored.

The contents of the file/socket may be arbitrary binary or textual data, including newline characters and NUL bytes.

The LoadCredentialEncrypted= setting is identical to LoadCredential= , except that the credential data is decrypted and authenticated before being passed on to the executed processes. Specifically, the referenced path should refer to a file or socket with an encrypted credential, as implemented by systemd-creds (1) . This credential is loaded, decrypted, authenticated and then passed to the application in plaintext form, in the same way a regular credential specified via LoadCredential= would be. A credential configured this way may be symmetrically encrypted/authenticated with a secret key derived from the system’s TPM2 security chip, or with a secret key stored in /var/lib/systemd/credentials.secret , or with both. Using encrypted and authenticated credentials improves security as credentials are not stored in plaintext and only authenticated and decrypted into plaintext the moment a service requiring them is started. Moreover, credentials may be bound to the local hardware and installations, so that they cannot easily be analyzed offline, or be generated externally. When DevicePolicy= is set to » closed » or » strict «, or set to » auto » and DeviceAllow= is set, or PrivateDevices= is set, then this setting adds /dev/tpmrm0 with rw mode to DeviceAllow= . See systemd.resource-control (5) for the details about DevicePolicy= or DeviceAllow= .

The credential files/IPC sockets must be accessible to the service manager, but don’t have to be directly accessible to the unit’s processes: the credential data is read and copied into separate, read-only copies for the unit that are accessible to appropriately privileged processes. This is particularly useful in combination with DynamicUser= as this way privileged data can be made available to processes running under a dynamic UID (i.e. not a previously known one) without having to open up access to all users.

In order to reference the path a credential may be read from within a ExecStart= command line use » $/mycred «, e.g. » ExecStart=cat $/mycred «. In order to reference the path a credential may be read from within a Environment= line use » %d/mycred «, e.g. » Environment=MYCREDPATH=%d/mycred «.

Currently, an accumulated credential size limit of 1 MB per unit is enforced.

The service manager itself may receive system credentials that can be propagated to services from a hosting container manager or VM hypervisor. See the Container Interface documentation for details about the former. For the latter, pass DMI/SMBIOS OEM string table entries (field type 11) with a prefix of » io.systemd.credential: » or » io.systemd.credential.binary: «. In both cases a key/value pair separated by » = » is expected, in the latter case the right-hand side is Base64 decoded when parsed (thus permitting binary data to be passed in). Example qemu switch: » -smbios type=11,value=io.systemd.credential:xx=yy «, or » -smbios type=11,value=io.systemd.credential.binary:rick=TmV2ZXIgR29ubmEgR2l2ZSBZb3UgVXA= «. Alternatively, use the qemu » fw_cfg » node » opt/io.systemd.credentials/ «. Example qemu switch: » -fw_cfg name=opt/io.systemd.credentials/mycred,string=supersecret «. They may also be passed from the UEFI firmware environment via systemd-stub (7) , from the initrd (see systemd (1) ), or be specified on the kernel command line using the » systemd.set_credential= » and » systemd.set_credential_binary= » switches (see systemd (1) – this is not recommended since unprivileged userspace can read the kernel command line).

If referencing an AF_UNIX stream socket to connect to, the connection will originate from an abstract namespace socket, that includes information about the unit and the credential ID in its socket name. Use getpeername (2) to query this information. The returned socket name is formatted as NUL RANDOM » /unit/ » UNIT » / » ID , i.e. a NUL byte (as required for abstract namespace socket names), followed by a random string (consisting of alphadecimal characters), followed by the literal string » /unit/ «, followed by the requesting unit name, followed by the literal character » / «, followed by the textual credential ID requested. Example: » \0adf9d86b6eda275e/unit/foobar.service/credx » in case the credential » credx » is requested for a unit » foobar.service «. This functionality is useful for using a single listening socket to serve credentials to multiple consumers.

For further information see System and Service Credentials documentation.

Pass one or more credentials to the unit. Takes a credential name for which we’ll attempt to find a credential that the service manager itself received under the specified name — which may be used to propagate credentials from an invoking environment (e.g. a container manager that invoked the service manager) into a service. If the credential name is a glob, all credentials matching the glob are passed to the unit. Matching credentials are searched for in the system credentials, the encrypted system credentials, and under /etc/credstore/ , /run/credstore/ , /usr/lib/credstore/ , /run/credstore.encrypted/ , /etc/credstore.encrypted/ , and /usr/lib/credstore.encrypted/ in that order. When multiple credentials of the same name are found, the first one found is used.

The globbing expression implements a restrictive subset of glob (7) : only a single trailing » * » wildcard may be specified. Both » ? » and » [] » wildcards are not permitted, nor are » * » wildcards anywhere except at the end of the glob expression.

When multiple credentials of the same name are found, credentials found by LoadCredential= and LoadCredentialEncrypted= take priority over credentials found by ImportCredential= .

SetCredential= ID : VALUE , SetCredentialEncrypted= ID : VALUE

The SetCredential= setting is similar to LoadCredential= but accepts a literal value to use as data for the credential, instead of a file system path to read the data from. Do not use this option for data that is supposed to be secret, as it is accessible to unprivileged processes via IPC. It’s only safe to use this for user IDs, public key material and similar non-sensitive data. For everything else use LoadCredential= . In order to embed binary data into the credential data use C-style escaping (i.e. » \n » to embed a newline, or » \x00 » to embed a NUL byte).

The SetCredentialEncrypted= setting is identical to SetCredential= but expects an encrypted credential in literal form as value. This allows embedding confidential credentials securely directly in unit files. Use systemd-creds (1) ‘ -p switch to generate suitable SetCredentialEncrypted= lines directly from plaintext credentials. For further details see LoadCredentialEncrypted= above.

When multiple credentials of the same name are found, credentials found by LoadCredential= , LoadCredentialEncrypted= and ImportCredential= take priority over credentials found by SetCredential= . As such, SetCredential= will act as default if no credentials are found by any of the former. In this case not being able to retrieve the credential from the path specified in LoadCredential= or LoadCredentialEncrypted= is not considered fatal.

System V Compatibility¶

UtmpIdentifier= utmp (5) and wtmp entry for this service. This should only be set for services such as getty implementations (such as agetty (8) ) where utmp/wtmp entries must be created and cleared before and after execution, or for services that shall be executed as if they were run by a getty process (see below). If the configured string is longer than four characters, it is truncated and the terminal four characters are used. This setting interprets %I style string replacements. This setting is unset by default, i.e. no utmp/wtmp entries are created or cleaned up for this service.

UtmpMode= init «, » login » or » user «. If UtmpIdentifier= is set, controls which type of utmp (5) /wtmp entries for this service are generated. This setting has no effect unless UtmpIdentifier= is set too. If » init » is set, only an INIT_PROCESS entry is generated and the invoked process must implement a getty -compatible utmp/wtmp logic. If » login » is set, first an INIT_PROCESS entry, followed by a LOGIN_PROCESS entry is generated. In this case, the invoked process must implement a login (1) -compatible utmp/wtmp logic. If » user » is set, first an INIT_PROCESS entry, then a LOGIN_PROCESS entry and finally a USER_PROCESS entry is generated. In this case, the invoked process may be any process that is suitable to be run as session leader. Defaults to » init «.

Environment Variables in Spawned Processes¶

Processes started by the service manager are executed with an environment variable block assembled from multiple sources. Processes started by the system service manager generally do not inherit environment variables set for the service manager itself (but this may be altered via PassEnvironment= ), but processes started by the user service manager instances generally do inherit all environment variables set for the service manager itself.

For each invoked process the list of environment variables set is compiled from the following sources:

  • Variables globally configured for the service manager, using the DefaultEnvironment= setting in systemd-system.conf (5) , the kernel command line option systemd.setenv= understood by systemd (1) , or via systemctl (1)set-environment verb.
  • Variables defined by the service manager itself (see the list below).
  • Variables set in the service manager’s own environment variable block (subject to PassEnvironment= for the system service manager).
  • Variables set via Environment= in the unit file.
  • Variables read from files specified via EnvironmentFile= in the unit file.
  • Variables set by any PAM modules in case PAMName= is in effect, cf. pam_env (8) .

If the same environment variable is set by multiple of these sources, the later source — according to the order of the list above — wins. Note that as the final step all variables listed in UnsetEnvironment= are removed from the compiled environment variable list, immediately before it is passed to the executed process.

The general philosophy is to expose a small curated list of environment variables to processes. Services started by the system manager (PID 1) will be started, without additional service-specific configuration, with just a few environment variables. The user manager inherits environment variables as any other system service, but in addition may receive additional environment variables from PAM, and, typically, additional imported variables when the user starts a graphical session. It is recommended to keep the environment blocks in both the system and user managers lean. Importing all variables inherited by the graphical session or by one of the user shells is strongly discouraged.

Hint: systemd-run -P env and systemd-run —user -P env print the effective system and user service environment blocks.

Environment Variables Set or Propagated by the Service Manager¶

The following environment variables are propagated by the service manager or generated internally for each invoked process:

Colon-separated list of directories to use when launching executables. systemd uses a fixed value of » /usr/local/sbin : /usr/local/bin : /usr/sbin : /usr/bin » in the system manager. When compiled for systems with «unmerged /usr/ » ( /bin is not a symlink to /usr/bin ), » : /sbin : /bin » is appended. In case of the user manager, a different path may be configured by the distribution. It is recommended to not rely on the order of entries, and have only one program with a given name in $PATH .

Locale. Can be set in locale.conf (5) or on the kernel command line (see systemd (1) and kernel-command-line (7) ).

$USER , $LOGNAME , $HOME , $SHELL ¶

User name (twice), home directory, and the login shell. The variables are set for the units that have User= set, which includes user systemd instances. See passwd (5) .

Contains a randomized, unique 128-bit ID identifying each runtime cycle of the unit, formatted as 32 character hexadecimal string. A new ID is assigned each time the unit changes from an inactive state into an activating or active state, and may be used to identify this specific runtime cycle, in particular in data stored offline, such as the journal. The same ID is passed to all processes run as part of the unit.

The directory to use for runtime objects (such as IPC objects) and volatile state. Set for all services run by the user systemd instance, as well as any system services that use PAMName= with a PAM stack that includes pam_systemd . See below and pam_systemd (8) for more information.

$RUNTIME_DIRECTORY , $STATE_DIRECTORY , $CACHE_DIRECTORY , $LOGS_DIRECTORY , $CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY ¶

Absolute paths to the directories defined with RuntimeDirectory= , StateDirectory= , CacheDirectory= , LogsDirectory= , and ConfigurationDirectory= when those settings are used.

An absolute path to the per-unit directory with credentials configured via ImportCredential= / LoadCredential= / SetCredential= . The directory is marked read-only and is placed in unswappable memory (if supported and permitted), and is only accessible to the UID associated with the unit via User= or DynamicUser= (and the superuser).

The PID of the unit’s main process if it is known. This is only set for control processes as invoked by ExecReload= and similar.

The PID of the user systemd instance, set for processes spawned by it.

$LISTEN_FDS , $LISTEN_PID , $LISTEN_FDNAMES ¶

Information about file descriptors passed to a service for socket activation. See sd_listen_fds (3) .

The socket sd_notify() talks to. See sd_notify (3) .

Information about watchdog keep-alive notifications. See sd_watchdog_enabled (3) .

The PID of the unit process (e.g. process invoked by ExecStart= ). The child process can use this information to determine whether the process is directly invoked by the service manager or indirectly as a child of another process by comparing this value with the current PID (similarly to the scheme used in sd_listen_fds (3) with $LISTEN_PID and $LISTEN_FDS ).

Terminal type, set only for units connected to a terminal ( StandardInput=tty , StandardOutput=tty , or StandardError=tty ). See termcap (5) .

Contains the name of the selected logging namespace when the LogNamespace= service setting is used.

If the standard output or standard error output of the executed processes are connected to the journal (for example, by setting StandardError=journal ) $JOURNAL_STREAM contains the device and inode numbers of the connection file descriptor, formatted in decimal, separated by a colon (» : «). This permits invoked processes to safely detect whether their standard output or standard error output are connected to the journal. The device and inode numbers of the file descriptors should be compared with the values set in the environment variable to determine whether the process output is still connected to the journal. Note that it is generally not sufficient to only check whether $JOURNAL_STREAM is set at all as services might invoke external processes replacing their standard output or standard error output, without unsetting the environment variable.

If both standard output and standard error of the executed processes are connected to the journal via a stream socket, this environment variable will contain information about the standard error stream, as that’s usually the preferred destination for log data. (Note that typically the same stream is used for both standard output and standard error, hence very likely the environment variable contains device and inode information matching both stream file descriptors.)

This environment variable is primarily useful to allow services to optionally upgrade their used log protocol to the native journal protocol (using sd_journal_print (3) and other functions) if their standard output or standard error output is connected to the journal anyway, thus enabling delivery of structured metadata along with logged messages.

Only used for the service unit type. This environment variable is passed to all ExecStop= and ExecStopPost= processes, and encodes the service «result». Currently, the following values are defined:

Table 5. Defined $SERVICE_RESULT values

Value Meaning
» success « The service ran successfully and exited cleanly.
» protocol « A protocol violation occurred: the service did not take the steps required by its unit configuration (specifically what is configured in its Type= setting).
» timeout « One of the steps timed out.
» exit-code « Service process exited with a non-zero exit code; see $EXIT_CODE below for the actual exit code returned.
» signal « A service process was terminated abnormally by a signal, without dumping core. See $EXIT_CODE below for the actual signal causing the termination.
» core-dump « A service process terminated abnormally with a signal and dumped core. See $EXIT_CODE below for the signal causing the termination.
» watchdog « Watchdog keep-alive ping was enabled for the service, but the deadline was missed.
» start-limit-hit « A start limit was defined for the unit and it was hit, causing the unit to fail to start. See systemd.unit (5) ‘s StartLimitIntervalSec= and StartLimitBurst= for details.
» resources « A catch-all condition in case a system operation failed.

This environment variable is useful to monitor failure or successful termination of a service. Even though this variable is available in both ExecStop= and ExecStopPost= , it is usually a better choice to place monitoring tools in the latter, as the former is only invoked for services that managed to start up correctly, and the latter covers both services that failed during their start-up and those which failed during their runtime.

Only defined for the service unit type. These environment variables are passed to all ExecStop= , ExecStopPost= processes and contain exit status/code information of the main process of the service. For the precise definition of the exit code and status, see wait (2) . $EXIT_CODE is one of » exited «, » killed «, » dumped «. $EXIT_STATUS contains the numeric exit code formatted as string if $EXIT_CODE is » exited «, and the signal name in all other cases. Note that these environment variables are only set if the service manager succeeded to start and identify the main process of the service.

Table 6. Summary of possible service result variable values

$SERVICE_RESULT $EXIT_CODE $EXIT_STATUS
» success « » killed « » HUP «, » INT «, » TERM «, » PIPE «
» exited « » 0 «
» protocol « not set not set
» exited « » 0 «
» timeout « » killed « » TERM «, » KILL «
» exited « » 0 «, » 1 «, » 2 «, » 3 «, …, » 255 «
» exit-code « » exited « » 1 «, » 2 «, » 3 «, …, » 255 «
» signal « » killed « » HUP «, » INT «, » KILL «, …
» core-dump « » dumped « » ABRT «, » SEGV «, » QUIT «, …
» watchdog « » dumped « » ABRT «
» killed « » TERM «, » KILL «
» exited « » 0 «, » 1 «, » 2 «, » 3 «, …, » 255 «
» exec-condition « » exited « » 1 «, » 2 «, » 3 «, » 4 «, …, » 254 «
» oom-kill « » killed « » TERM «, » KILL «
» start-limit-hit « not set not set
» resources « any of the above any of the above
Note: the process may be also terminated by a signal not sent by systemd. In particular the process may send an arbitrary signal to itself in a handler for any of the non-maskable signals. Nevertheless, in the » timeout » and » watchdog » rows above only the signals that systemd sends have been included. Moreover, using SuccessExitStatus= additional exit statuses may be declared to indicate clean termination, which is not reflected by this table.

$MONITOR_SERVICE_RESULT , $MONITOR_EXIT_CODE , $MONITOR_EXIT_STATUS , $MONITOR_INVOCATION_ID , $MONITOR_UNIT ¶

Only defined for the service unit type. Those environment variables are passed to all ExecStart= and ExecStartPre= processes which run in services triggered by OnFailure= or OnSuccess= dependencies.

Variables $MONITOR_SERVICE_RESULT , $MONITOR_EXIT_CODE and $MONITOR_EXIT_STATUS take the same values as for ExecStop= and ExecStopPost= processes. Variables $MONITOR_INVOCATION_ID and $MONITOR_UNIT are set to the invocation id and unit name of the service which triggered the dependency.

Note that when multiple services trigger the same unit, those variables will be not be passed. Consider using a template handler unit for that case instead: » OnFailure= handler @%n.service » for non-templated units, or » OnFailure= handler @%p-%i.service » for templated units.

The path to the configured PID file, in case the process is forked off on behalf of a service that uses the PIDFile= setting, see systemd.service (5) for details. Service code may use this environment variable to automatically generate a PID file at the location configured in the unit file. This field is set to an absolute path in the file system.

If this is a unit started via per-connection socket activation (i.e. via a socket unit with Accept=yes ), these environment variables contain the IP address and port number of the remote peer of the socket connection.

$TRIGGER_UNIT , $TRIGGER_PATH , $TRIGGER_TIMER_REALTIME_USEC , $TRIGGER_TIMER_MONOTONIC_USEC ¶

If the unit was activated dynamically (e.g.: a corresponding path unit or timer unit), the unit that triggered it and other type-dependent information will be passed via these variables. Note that this information is provided in a best-effort way. For example, multiple triggers happening one after another will be coalesced and only one will be reported, with no guarantee as to which one it will be. Because of this, in most cases this variable will be primarily informational, i.e. useful for debugging purposes, is lossy, and should not be relied upon to propagate a comprehensive reason for activation.

If memory pressure monitoring is enabled for this service unit, the path to watch and the data to write into it. See Memory Pressure Handling for details about these variables and the service protocol data they convey.

If the file descriptor store is enabled for a service (i.e. FileDescriptorStoreMax= is set to a non-zero value, see systemd.service (5) for details), this environment variable will be set to the maximum number of permitted entries, as per the setting. Applications may check this environment variable before sending file descriptors to the service manager via sd_pid_notify_with_fds() (see sd_notify (3) for details).

For system services, when PAMName= is enabled and pam_systemd is part of the selected PAM stack, additional environment variables defined by systemd may be set for services. Specifically, these are $XDG_SEAT , $XDG_VTNR , see pam_systemd (8) for details.

Process Exit Codes¶

When invoking a unit process the service manager possibly fails to apply the execution parameters configured with the settings above. In that case the already created service process will exit with a non-zero exit code before the configured command line is executed. (Or in other words, the child process possibly exits with these error codes, after having been created by the fork (2) system call, but before the matching execve (2) system call is called.) Specifically, exit codes defined by the C library, by the LSB specification and by the systemd service manager itself are used.

The following basic service exit codes are defined by the C library.

Table 7. Basic C library exit codes

Exit Code Symbolic Name Description
0 EXIT_SUCCESS Generic success code.
1 EXIT_FAILURE Generic failure or unspecified error.

The following service exit codes are defined by the LSB specification.

Table 8. LSB service exit codes

Exit Code Symbolic Name Description
2 EXIT_INVALIDARGUMENT Invalid or excess arguments.
3 EXIT_NOTIMPLEMENTED Unimplemented feature.
4 EXIT_NOPERMISSION The user has insufficient privileges.
5 EXIT_NOTINSTALLED The program is not installed.
6 EXIT_NOTCONFIGURED The program is not configured.
7 EXIT_NOTRUNNING The program is not running.

The LSB specification suggests that error codes 200 and above are reserved for implementations. Some of them are used by the service manager to indicate problems during process invocation:

Table 9. systemd-specific exit codes

Exit Code Symbolic Name Description
200 EXIT_CHDIR Changing to the requested working directory failed. See WorkingDirectory= above.
201 EXIT_NICE Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level). See Nice= above.
202 EXIT_FDS Failed to close unwanted file descriptors, or to adjust passed file descriptors.
203 EXIT_EXEC The actual process execution failed (specifically, the execve (2) system call). Most likely this is caused by a missing or non-accessible executable file.
204 EXIT_MEMORY Failed to perform an action due to memory shortage.
205 EXIT_LIMITS Failed to adjust resource limits. See LimitCPU= and related settings above.
206 EXIT_OOM_ADJUST Failed to adjust the OOM setting. See OOMScoreAdjust= above.
207 EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK Failed to set process signal mask.
208 EXIT_STDIN Failed to set up standard input. See StandardInput= above.
209 EXIT_STDOUT Failed to set up standard output. See StandardOutput= above.
210 EXIT_CHROOT Failed to change root directory ( chroot (2) ). See RootDirectory= / RootImage= above.
211 EXIT_IOPRIO Failed to set up IO scheduling priority. See IOSchedulingClass= / IOSchedulingPriority= above.
212 EXIT_TIMERSLACK Failed to set up timer slack. See TimerSlackNSec= above.
213 EXIT_SECUREBITS Failed to set process secure bits. See SecureBits= above.
214 EXIT_SETSCHEDULER Failed to set up CPU scheduling. See CPUSchedulingPolicy= / CPUSchedulingPriority= above.
215 EXIT_CPUAFFINITY Failed to set up CPU affinity. See CPUAffinity= above.
216 EXIT_GROUP Failed to determine or change group credentials. See Group= / SupplementaryGroups= above.
217 EXIT_USER Failed to determine or change user credentials, or to set up user namespacing. See User= / PrivateUsers= above.
218 EXIT_CAPABILITIES Failed to drop capabilities, or apply ambient capabilities. See CapabilityBoundingSet= / AmbientCapabilities= above.
219 EXIT_CGROUP Setting up the service control group failed.
220 EXIT_SETSID Failed to create new process session.
221 EXIT_CONFIRM Execution has been cancelled by the user. See the systemd.confirm_spawn= kernel command line setting on kernel-command-line (7) for details.
222 EXIT_STDERR Failed to set up standard error output. See StandardError= above.
224 EXIT_PAM Failed to set up PAM session. See PAMName= above.
225 EXIT_NETWORK Failed to set up network namespacing. See PrivateNetwork= above.
226 EXIT_NAMESPACE Failed to set up mount, UTS, or IPC namespacing. See ReadOnlyPaths= , ProtectHostname= , PrivateIPC= , and related settings above.
227 EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES Failed to disable new privileges. See NoNewPrivileges=yes above.
228 EXIT_SECCOMP Failed to apply system call filters. See SystemCallFilter= and related settings above.
229 EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT Determining or changing SELinux context failed. See SELinuxContext= above.
230 EXIT_PERSONALITY Failed to set up an execution domain (personality). See Personality= above.
231 EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE Failed to prepare changing AppArmor profile. See AppArmorProfile= above.
232 EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES Failed to restrict address families. See RestrictAddressFamilies= above.
233 EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY Setting up runtime directory failed. See RuntimeDirectory= and related settings above.
235 EXIT_CHOWN Failed to adjust socket ownership. Used for socket units only.
236 EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL Failed to set SMACK label. See SmackProcessLabel= above.
237 EXIT_KEYRING Failed to set up kernel keyring.
238 EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY Failed to set up unit’s state directory. See StateDirectory= above.
239 EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY Failed to set up unit’s cache directory. See CacheDirectory= above.
240 EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY Failed to set up unit’s logging directory. See LogsDirectory= above.
241 EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY Failed to set up unit’s configuration directory. See ConfigurationDirectory= above.
242 EXIT_NUMA_POLICY Failed to set up unit’s NUMA memory policy. See NUMAPolicy= and NUMAMask= above.
243 EXIT_CREDENTIALS Failed to set up unit’s credentials. See ImportCredential= , LoadCredential= and SetCredential= above.
245 EXIT_BPF Failed to apply BPF restrictions. See RestrictFileSystems= above.

Finally, the BSD operating systems define a set of exit codes, typically defined on Linux systems too:

Table 10. BSD exit codes

Exit Code Symbolic Name Description
64 EX_USAGE Command line usage error
65 EX_DATAERR Data format error
66 EX_NOINPUT Cannot open input
67 EX_NOUSER Addressee unknown
68 EX_NOHOST Host name unknown
69 EX_UNAVAILABLE Service unavailable
70 EX_SOFTWARE internal software error
71 EX_OSERR System error (e.g., can’t fork)
72 EX_OSFILE Critical OS file missing
73 EX_CANTCREAT Can’t create (user) output file
74 EX_IOERR Input/output error
75 EX_TEMPFAIL Temporary failure; user is invited to retry
76 EX_PROTOCOL Remote error in protocol
77 EX_NOPERM Permission denied
78 EX_CONFIG Configuration error

Examples¶

Example 3. $MONITOR_ * usage

A service myfailer.service which can trigger an OnFailure= dependency.

[Unit] Description=Service which can trigger an OnFailure= dependency OnFailure=myhandler.service [Service] ExecStart=/bin/myprogram

A service mysuccess.service which can trigger an OnSuccess= dependency.

[Unit] Description=Service which can trigger an OnSuccess= dependency OnSuccess=myhandler.service [Service] ExecStart=/bin/mysecondprogram

A service myhandler.service which can be triggered by any of the above services.

[Unit] Description=Acts on service failing or succeeding [Service] ExecStart=/bin/bash -c "echo $MONITOR_SERVICE_RESULT $MONITOR_EXIT_CODE $MONITOR_EXIT_STATUS $MONITOR_INVOCATION_ID $MONITOR_UNIT"

If myfailer.service were to run and exit in failure, then myhandler.service would be triggered and the monitor variables would be set as follows:

MONITOR_SERVICE_RESULT=exit-code MONITOR_EXIT_CODE=exited MONITOR_EXIT_STATUS=1 MONITOR_INVOCATION_ID=cc8fdc149b2b4ca698d4f259f4054236 MONITOR_UNIT=myfailer.service

If mysuccess.service were to run and exit in success, then myhandler.service would be triggered and the monitor variables would be set as follows:

MONITOR_SERVICE_RESULT=success MONITOR_EXIT_CODE=exited MONITOR_EXIT_STATUS=0 MONITOR_INVOCATION_ID=6ab9af147b8c4a3ebe36e7a5f8611697 MONITOR_UNIT=mysuccess.service

Добавить комментарий

Ваш адрес email не будет опубликован. Обязательные поля помечены *